Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice: The Case of Environmental Regulation by Jonathan Nash
American Law & Economics
Association Annual Meetings
Year 2004 Paper 53
Framing Eects and Regulatory Choice:
The Case of Environmental Regulation
Jonathan R. Nash
Tulane Law School
This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be
commercially reproduced without the publisher's permission.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art53
Copyright c 
2004 by the author.FRAMING EFFECTS AND REGULATORY 




This Article argues that the way in which regulatory regimes are 
framed has an impact upon regime choice.  To establish this, the Article 
considers the underutilization of market-based regulatory devices in the 
area of environmental control.  
Despite market-based regulations’ advantages over their principal 
competitor,  command-and-control  regulation,  the  latter  remains  the 
dominant regulatory form.  This Article identifies three framing effects 
that  render  market-based  regulatory  instruments  more  susceptible  to 
criticism than their command-and-control counterparts.  First, market-
based regimes tend to deemphasize the role of government, identifying 
the government only as the source of pollution rights that are distributed 
to  societal  actors.    Second,  market-based  instruments  are  seen  to 
partition  the  pollution  emissions  of  societal  actors  from  the  socially 
beneficial activities that the actors undertake.  Third, while command-
and-control  regulations  are  seen  to  impose  limits  or  restrictions  on 
polluters’  ability  to  pollute,  market-based  regulation  tend  to  depict 
polluters as receiving anew the right to pollute; in this sense, market-
based regimes are framed as achieving an environmental loss.  A careful 
examination of various environmental regulatory tools reveals that these 
effects are grounded in framing, not reality.  Nonetheless, they provide 
the  basis  for  criticisms,  such  as  the  “right  to  pollute”  and 
“commodification” critiques, that have been lodged successfully against 
market-based  regulatory  forms.    Thus,  these  framing  effects  have 
influenced the choice of regulatory instruments.  
Having  established  the  effects  of  framing  on  environmental 
instrument choice, the Article proceeds to recommend ways in which the 
frames of market-based instruments might be changed so as to reduce 
the barriers to their implementation that result from framing effects.
The Article concludes with the argument that framing effects have an 
impact on regulatory choice beyond the environmental arena.
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Recent contributions to the literature in the fields of economics and 
psychology  establish  that  the  way  in  which  a  problem,  question,  or 
dilemma is presented to individuals may affect their responses.  So-called 
“framing effects” may result in deviations from what economists would 
call a “rational” response to a problem.  
The legal literature has recognized the importance of this behavioral 
law and economics innovation (among others).  If people act irrationally 
because  of  framing  effects,  then  legal  rules  designed  based  upon  the 
expectation that people will react in an economically rational way to them 
will  not  be  effective.    Indeed,  legal  rules  ought  to  be  designed  with 
behavioral  law  and  economic  insights—including  framing  effects—in 
mind.
But the legal literature has yet to consider the possibility that public 
perception of different types of regulatory instruments, as influenced by 
framing effects, may have an impact on instrument choice.  Framing effects 
may  render  instruments  subject  to  criticism  to  which  other,  competing 
instruments  are  not  subject,  even  if  in  economic  reality—i.e.,  framing 
effects to the side—the competing instruments could be subjected to the 
same criticism.  
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In this Article, I argue that framing effects can indeed play a role in 
rendering  certain  regulatory  instruments  more  subject  to  criticism,  and 
therefore less viable.  As a case study, I use the question of environmental 
regulatory instrument choice.  This focus is appropriate in light of the gulf 
between  favorable  theoretical  evaluations  of  market-based  regulation  on 
the one hand, and generally negative public perceptions of market-based 
regulation  and  the  suboptimal  usage  of  market-based  regulatory 
instruments.  The academic popularity of market-based regulation has not 
translated  into  widespread  implementation  of  market-based  instruments.  
This is the result in large part of successful organized opposition to market-
based  regimes.    Opponents  of  market-based  regimes  tend  to  raise  two 
related, but distinct, arguments against them.  First, it is often asserted that 
market-based regulatory instruments should be rejected because they give 
rise to a “right to pollute”.  Second, opponents argue against market-based 
regimes on the ground that they wrongly “commodify” the environment.
In  reality,  virtually  all  environmental  regulatory  regimes  can 
properly be subjected to versions of both these critiques.  Nonetheless, the 
“right  to  pollute”  and  “commodification”  critiques  persist  as  effective 
challenges  particularly  to  market-based  regulatory  schemes.    I  suggest 
three frame-related reasons for the critiques’ ongoing vitality with respect 
to  market-based  regulation.    First,  market-based  regulations  tend  to 
emphasize  the  role  of  private  actors  and  to  minimize  the  role  of  the 
government.    Second,  market-based  regulations  are  seen  to  separate 
pollution from the underlying benefit of the activity that results in pollution 
generation.  Third, market-based regulations are seen to confer rights upon, 
rather than to take rights away from, polluters.  
These  three  factors  result  in  market-based  regulatory  forms’ 
heightened susceptibility to the “right to pollute” and “commodification” 
critiques.  In effect, the critiques’ applicability is at least in part a framing 
effect.  
This conclusion is important on two levels.  First, with respect to 
environmental regulatory instrument choice, understanding the critiques as 
the  results  of  framing  helps  to  explain  the  continued  dominance  of 
command-and-control  regulation  despite  widespread  endorsement  of 
market-based instruments.   It also suggests that changes to the market-
based  instruments’  frame  might  reduce  framing  effects,  thereby  making 
those instruments more palatable.  
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Second,  on  a  broader  level,  the  analysis  with  respect  to 
environmental  regulation  suggests  that  framing  effects  may  affect 
instrument  choice  in  general.    Along  similar  lines,  understanding 
commodification of the environment as at least in part a framing effect may 
shed light on the proper scope of the “commodification” critique: When, 
exactly,  is  it  wrong  for  a  legal  regime  to  “commodify”  what  had  not 
previously been a commodity?  
This Article proceeds as follows.  First, in Part II, I describe the 
contributions of behavioral law and economics literature, and then focus on 
the notion of framing effects.  In Part III, I provide an overview of the 
regulatory tools generally available to environmental regulators.  In Part 
IV, I elucidate the “right to pollute” and “commodification” critiques as 
applied to environmental regulation.  In Part V, I analyze the economically 
proper scope of the “right to pollute” and “commodification” critiques with 
respect to environmental regulatory instruments.  
In  Part  VI,  I  first  describe  the  differing  frames  of  various 
environmental regulatory tools.  I then describe how those differing frames 
give rise to framing effects that are likely to affect public perception of and 
reaction to different regulatory tools.  In Part VII, I assess the prospect for 
reframing as a means to defuse objections to the introduction of market-
based regulation.  In Part VIII, I outline broad lessons that might be taken, 
as well as possible avenues for future research.
II. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND FRAMING EFFECTS
In this Part, I present an overview of behavioral law and economics.  
I  then  focus  on  one  insight  of  behavioral  law  and  economics:  framing 
effects.
Basic economic analysis of law rests upon the traditional economic 
assumption  that  actors  act  in  their  economic  self-interest.    Empirical 
evidence  indicates,  however,  that  this  assumption  is  in  many  cases  not 
justified:  Human  behavior,  in  other  words,  diverges  from  what  pure 
economic self-interest as a motivation might suggest.
1  Behavioral law and 
1 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 207 
(2001) (noting that most people “behave like homo sapiens, not like homo economicus” (citing 
Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (2000)); see
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-81 (1998) (identifying and discussing differences between “homo 
economicus” and “real people”).
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economics seeks to improve the predictive power of traditional law and 
economics by incorporating behavioral considerations into the model.
2
Framing effects are one example of an observable behavioral trait 
for  which  the  traditional  “rational  actor”  model  does  not  allow.    As 
expounded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the precise way in 
which a problem or choice is presented—i.e., its frame—may affect the 
decisionmaker’s perception of the problem or choice, and ultimately the 
decisionmaker’s preference.
3
The  relevance  of  framing  turns  upon  another  concept  critical  to 
behavioral law and economics: Kahneman and Tversky’s ground-breaking 
work on prospect theory.
4   Prospect theory asserts two fundamental ways 
in which people perceive options differently than the rational actor model 
would  predict.    First,  people  value  a  loss  of  a  certain  amount  more 
negatively than the positive value they associate with a gain of the same 
amount.    Second,  people  tend  to  overweight  low  probabilities  and  to 
underweight moderate and high probabilities, with the latter effect being 
more pronounced than the former.  
The validity of prospect theory suggests the importance of framing.  
As  Tversky  and  Kahneman  explain,  if  people  valued  gains  and  losses 
equally  and  perceived  probabilities  exactly  as  they  actually  are,  then 
framing would not matter.  But, insofar as they do, “different frames can 
lead  to  different  choices.”
5    A  simple  example  is  that  “the  possible 
2 See,  e.g.,  Jolls  et  al.,  supra  note  1;  Russell  B.  Korobkin  &  Thomas  S.  Ulen,  Law  and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1051 (2000); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
3 See  generally  Amos  Tversky  &  Daniel  Kahneman,  The  Framing  of  Decisions  and  the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of 
Decisions].    
4 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCH.
341 (1984), reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky 
eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra, at 17; 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representations of 
Uncertainty, 5 J. Risk & Uncertainty 297 (1992), reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES,  AND FRAMES, 
supra, at 44.
5  Tversky  &  Kahneman,  Framing  of  Decisions,  supra  note  3,  at  454.    Technically,  the 
importance of framing rests upon the nonlinearity of the perceived value and perceived probability 
functions that prospect theory predicts.  See id. See also Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting 
Matters, 12 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 183 (1999), reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES,  AND 
FRAMES, supra note 4, at 241, 244 (noting as an “important features” of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory with respect to mental accounting that (i) “[t]he value function is defined over 
gains and losses relative to some reference point,” (ii) [b]oth the gain and loss functions display 
diminishing sensitivity,” and (iii) the theory respects the concept of loss aversion).
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outcomes of a gamble can be framed either as gains and losses relative to 
the status quo or as asset positions that incorporate initial wealth.”
6
There are, in effect, two aspects to framing effects: people’s natural 
tendencies  in  formulating  frames—so-called  “mental  accounting”
7—and 
the  ability  of  someone  who  is  propounding  an  option  to  present  the 
option—i.e., to frame it—in such a way as to take advantage of framing 
effects and make the option seem more or less desirable.
8  The fact that the 
frame in which an option is presented may be chosen deliberately with an 
eye toward affecting its perception is a point to which I return below, in the 
context of the possible use of education to correct economically inaccurate 
perceptions.
9
Tversky and Kahneman identify three particular types of framing 
that can result in actions that are anomalous if evaluated under the rational 
actor  model  standard:  framing  of  acts,  framing  of  contingencies,  and 
framing of outcomes.
10  Framing of acts refers the question of whether two 
decisions  are  presented  independently  or  in  tandem.
11    Framing  of 
contingencies refers to whether a possibility is presented as more or less 
contingent or certain.
12  Framing of outcomes refers to whether outcomes 
are presented as gains or losses in respect of the status quo.
13
For discussions of the effects of framing on behavior, see, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 
Framing  of  Decisions,  supra  note  3,  at  454-55;  Amos  Tversky  &  Daniel  Kahneman,  Rational 
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 5251 (1986), reprinted in reprinted in CHOICES, 
VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 4, at 209; Eric J. Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros & 
Howard  Kunreuther,  Framing,  Probability  Distortions,  and  Insurance  Decisions,  7  J.  RISK  & 
UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993), reprinted in reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 4, at 
224.
6 Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 4, at 4.  
7 See Thaler,  supra  note 5, at 248-68.
8 See id. at 245-46 (describing “principles of hedonic framing, that is, the way of evaluating 
joint outcomes to maximize utility,” and suggesting ways in which marketers might take advantage 
of it); id. at 246-48 (discussing the divergence between “hedonic framing”  and actual framing 
tendencies).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 185-86.  
10 See Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions, supra note 3, at 454.  
11 See id. at 454-55.
12 See id. at 455-56.
13 See id. at 456-57.  Kahneman and Tversky define a “psychological account”—later referred 
to in the literature as a “mental account,” Thaler, supra note 5, at 244—as “an outcome frame 
which specifies (i) the set of elementary outcomes that are evaluated jointly and the manner in 
which  they  are  combined  and  (ii) a  reference  outcome  that  is  considered  neutral  or  normal.”  
Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 4, at 456.  As Thaler explains, the 
reference point is typically the status quo.  Thaler, supra note 5, at 244.  
In  a  subsequent  paper,  Kahneman  and  Tversky  identified  three  different  ways  in  which 
outcomes might be framed: as a minimal account, as a topical account, and as a comprehensive 
account.  See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, supra note 5, 
at 11.  Thaler elucidates: 
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The legal literature has recognized the importance of this behavioral 
law  and  economics  innovation  (among  others).    Commentators  have 
recognized that, if people act irrationally because of framing effects, then 
legal rules that are designed to anticipate economically rational responses 
from societal actors may not function as expected.
14  Other commentators 
have relied upon framing effects to argue that societal actors’ responses to 
different types of legal rules may differ even if the rules are economically 
indistinguishable.
15  And commentators have also recognized that framing 
effects may influence bargaining undertaken with the potential application 
of a legal rule lurking in the background.
16
Absent from the legal literature, however, is analysis of the extent 
to which public perception of competing regulatory options—as influenced 
by  how  the  public  is  likely  to  see  the  options  as  being  framed—might 
affect the viability of those options.
17  Such an analysis differs from extant 
Comparing  two  options  using  the  minimal  account  entails  examining  only  the 
differences between the two options, disregarding all their common features.  A topical 
account  relates  the  consequences  of  possible  choices  to  a  reference  level  that  is 
determined by the context within which the decision arises.  A comprehensive account 
incorporates  all  other  factors  including  current  wealth,  future  earnings,  possible 
outcomes of other probabilistic holdings, and so on.
Thaler, supra note 5, at 244-45.  While “[e]conomic theory generally assumes that people make 
decisions using the comprehensive account,” id., Kahneman and Tversky suggest that in fact people 
tend to “evaluate acts in terms of a minimal account, which includes only the direct consequences 
of the act,” Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 4, at 456-57.
Other commentators have devised another typology of so-called “valence framing” (that is, 
framing  that  describes  options  in  positive  or  negative  terms).    See  Irwin  P.  Levin,  Sandra  L. 
Schneider & Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis 
of Framing Effects, 76 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150 (1998) (dividing 
valence framing into “risky choice framing,” “attribute framing,” and “goal framing”).  
14 See, e.g., Edward McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury: 
Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 2, at 259.
15 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 288, 294-98 (arguing that framing effects may 
result in a redistributive legal rule having less of a distortional effect on the work incentives of 
those benefited and burdened by the rule than a tax rule, even if the two rules are economically 
identical).
16 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (discussing framing effects on plea bargaining).
17 Cf. David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. 
L. REV. 1315, 1330 (2003) (“There is little discussion in the behavioral economics literature of 
what  relevance,  if  any,  biases  affecting  individual  choice  have  in  the  context  of  political 
decisionmaking and outcomes.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 
111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 n.2 (2002) (“This Article does not explore the connection between the 
psychology of individual decisionmaking and the law's approach to framing transactions, although 
the  intriguing  connection  is  well  worth  noticing.”).    Dana  explains  the  connection  between 
individuals’ cognitive biases and political results.  First, politicians will tend to respond to public 
opinion, which in turn may be influenced by cognitive biases.  Dana, supra, at 1330.  Second, from 
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studies involving framing effects, insofar as the hypothesis I advance here 
suggests that a regulatory regime’s framing effects might have influence 
even beyond those actors specifically subject to the particular regime.  In 
this  Article,  I  advance  this  hypothesis  in  the  context  of  environmental 
regulation.
18
III. OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY TOOLS
In this Part, I present a brief overview of prevalent environmental 
regulatory  tools—command-and-control  regimes,  information-based 
regimes, tax-based regimes, and tradable pollution permit regimes.  
A  command-and-control  regime  entails  the  government  setting  a 
particular standard with which polluters are obligated to comply.
19 The 
most  common  species  of  command-and-control  regime  is  technology-
based—that  is,  a  command-and-control  system  under  which  the 
government  mandates  installation  of  a  particular  pollution  reduction 
technology.  It is also possible for command-and-control regimes instead to 
rely upon government-established effluent limitations; the latter form of 
regime leaves polluters free to decide how to comply with the mandated 
maximum  effluent  standards  (whether  by  installation  of  one  type  of 
technology or another, or otherwise).  
An information-based regime requires polluters to divulge certain 
information about pollution releases.
20  In return, polluters remain free to 
pollute;  there  is  no  mandated  pollution  reduction  or  elimination 
requirement.  In effect, the release of information “buys” the polluter the 
right to continue to pollute.  The rationale underlying information-based 
a interest group perspective, Dana argues that “cognitive biases matter because they may affect the 
vigor with which a given interest group mobilizes and how much it therefore will invest in the 
political process in order to secure a favorable outcome.”  Id. at 1331.  In addition, it seems that 
environmental political entrepreneurs would have an easier, and cheaper, time mobilizing public 
opinion  where  it  is  possible  to  feed  into  cognitive  biases.    Cf. Dale  B.  Thompson,  Political 
Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 664-67 (2000) 
(describing  how  “political  entrepreneurs”  harnessed  public  opposition  to  defeat  inclusion  of 
consumer products that caused pollution in regional pollution permit trading program).
18 See infra Parts V, VI.  
19 See  Jonathan  Remy  Nash,  Too  Much  Market?  Conflict  Between  Tradable  Pollution 
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 481 (2000). 
20  For  example,  the  Toxic  Substances  Control  Act,  15  U.S.C.  §§ 2601 - 2692,  requires 
manufacturers and processors of chemical substances to maintain and file records of the chemicals 
they produce, see id. § 2607(a).  EPA then compiles all the filings it receives and periodically 
releases a list of every chemical substance manufactured or processed in the United States.  See id.
§ 2607(b).    See  also  Emergency  Planning  and  Community  Right-to-Know  Act,  42  U.S.C. 
§§ 11001-11050  (requiring  disclosure  of  releases  of  toxic  substances  and  maintenance  of  the 
Toxics Release Inventory).
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regimes is that the release of pollution information will give rise to public 
pressure that will compel firms to reduce or eliminate pollution.
The remaining environmental regulatory tools—tax-based regimes 
and tradable pollution permit regimes—fall under the rubric of “market-
based”  regulatory  devices.    The  two  tools  are  called  “market-based” 
because  they  each  envision  polluters  making  economic  decisions  as  to 
whether and how much to pollute, based upon the effective market price of 
pollution.  As I explain below, market-based systems offer the possibility 
of achieving a desired level of pollution reduction cost-effectively—i.e., at 
the lowest possible cost.
Under  a  tax-based  regime,  the  government  sets  a  tax  rate  for 
pollution emissions.  Each polluter must pay tax at that rate for each unit of 
pollution that the polluter emits.  A tax-based regime imposes no explicit 
overall limit on pollution.  The system relies upon the costs of pollution, as 
imposed through the pollution tax, to incentivize pollution reductions.  If 
societal actors act with economic rationality, then actors whose marginal 
cost of pollution reduction is greater than the tax will continue to pollute 
and simply pay the tax; those whose marginal cost of pollution reduction is 
lower than the tax will instead opt to reduce their pollution emissions.  In 
this way, a tax-based system will induce the most cost-effective pollution 
reduction steps, and thus tend to achieve overall pollution reduction at the 
lowest possible cost.
The implementation of a standard tradable pollution permit consists 
of  three  basic  steps.
21    First,  the  government  determines  an  acceptable 
overall level of pollution for the region
22 to be regulated.  The government 
translates  that  overall  level  into  an  acceptable  amount  of  pollution 
emissions over a period of time (usually annually).  It then breaks that total 
amount down into numerous pieces, and assigns each piece to numerous 
“pollution permits” or “emissions allowances”.  Second, the government 
allocates the permits among societal actors.  Under extant programs, that is 
generally  accomplished  by  “grandfathering”  the  permits,  that  is,  by 
allocating them at no charge to preexisting polluters in proportion to each 
polluter’s  preexisting  pollution  record.
23    It  is  also  possible  to  use  an 
21 See Nash, supra note 19, at 483-85.
22 The use of the word “region” should not be taken to imply that tradable pollution permit 
regimes  cannot  apply  to  regulate  pollution  of  media  other  than  air.    To  the  contrary,  tradable 
pollution permit regimes have been used to regulate water pollution, for example.  See infra notes 
34-35 and accompanying text.
23 See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 284.
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auction  as  a  distribution  mechanism.
24    Third,  the  government  allows 
societal  actors  to  trade  the  permits  among  themselves.    Although  it  is 
possible to conceive of regimes under which trading might be limited in 
some way,
25 most extant regimes allow for unfettered trading within the 
regulated region.
26
Tradable  pollution  permit  regimes  seek  to  achieve  pollution 
reduction at the lowest possible cost,
27 to increase incentives to develop 
new pollution-reduction technologies, and to allocate pollution allowances 
to those who value them most highly.  These goals turn on the emergence 
of a robust market for permits, which in turn requires that transactions costs 
remain relatively low.
28
First, as to cost-effectiveness, trading allows a firm that can reduce 
its pollution emissions relatively cheaply to do so and be rewarded with 
excess pollution permits that it can sell.  On the other hand, a firm with a 
relatively high marginal cost of pollution reduction instead can choose to 
purchase  permits  at  less  cost.    Thus,  the  government’s  overall  level  of 
pollution reduction is achieved, but at a lower cost than if the government 
mandated that each polluter reduced its pollution proportionately.
29
Second, a trading regime rewards participants for every marginal 
reduction in pollution emissions they can achieve.  Because participants 
will  be  willing  to  pay  for  technologies  that  reduce  pollution  emissions, 
there is an incentive for companies to develop such technologies.
30  By 
contrast,  most  extant  environmental  regulatory  regimes  employ  a 
command-and-control approach that offers no reward, and therefore little 
24 The Clean Air Act requires that a few permits be distributed by auction each year.  See
Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit 
Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 585-86 (2001).
25 Indeed, Richard Revesz and I have recommended a system under which trading would be 
constrained in order to control against unacceptably large concentrations of pollutants at particular 
locations.  See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
26 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 582-614.  The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market 
(or “RECLAIM”) sulfur and nitrogen oxides emissions trading program in the greater Los Angeles 
metropolitan area does divide the regulated region into two zones—a coastal zone and an inland 
zone—with sales of permits allowed within either zone, but only from the coastal zone to the inland 
zone and not the other way.  Id. at 611-12.
27 Tradable pollution permit regimes generally do not, although they perhaps should, include 
distributional goals.  See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
28 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 631.
29 See Nash, supra note 19, at 485-86.
30 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman  & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1346 (1985).  For a skeptical analysis of this point, see David M. Driesen, 
Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,094 (2003). 
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incentive  to  develop  technologies,  to  reduce  emissions  below  the 
regulatory standard.
Third, a trading regime in theory will allocate pollution permits to 
those  societal  actors  who  value  them  most  highly.    Actors  who  value 
pollution  permits  highly—presumably  because  those  actors  can  use  the 
permits to make more of a profit from productive use of the permits than 
can other actors—will be willing to pay a premium to obtain permits; in 
contrast,  actors  who  value  the  permits  less  will  be  pleased  to  accept 
payment—presumably because they can profit more by selling the permits 
than by making use of them.  In the end, then, the permits should wind up 
in the hands of those who value them most highly.
31
Tradable pollution permits have become more common in recent 
years.
32    The  most  well  known  regime  is  the  flagship  national  sulfur 
dioxide emissions program that Congress enacted under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.
33  Tradable pollution permit regimes have also been 
used to regulate water pollution
34—indeed, the Environmental Protection 
Agency  has  recently  set  out  guidelines  for  states  to  implement  trading 
programs under the Clean Water Act
35—and proposals abound to extend 
31 But see Saul Levmore, Voting With Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 117-18 (2000) (arguing 
that, where wealth is distributed inequitably, markets will “not guarantee that goods will end up 
where they are most wanted”).  At the same time, Levmore by no means discounts the benefits of 
markets.  He elucidates:
While  markets  are  often  advertised  as  allocating  goods  to  the  highest  valuing  users, 
unequal wealth makes this claim contestable. The much more easily defended claim, and 
one that is normally advertised, is that markets encourage a larger economic pie, which is 
likely to find its way to the hands of many participants, wealthy and impoverished alike. 
In between is the plausible claim that even with wealth inequality, markets do a good job 
of  encouraging  a  reasonable  level  of  production  of  goods;  utility  is  unlikely  to  be 
increased in switching to a scheme in which some non-market force ordered or contracted 
for production levels. . . . Finally, even where markets enable wealthy but relatively low-
valuing users to acquire goods, these purchases do improve the positions of both buyers 
and sellers.
Id. at 118-19 (footnote omitted).
32  For  a  general  discussion  of  the  rising  role,  over  the  past  thirty  years,  of  environmental 
economics in environmental legal policy, see Wallace E. Oates, From Research to Policy: The 
Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 135.
33 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 - 7671q (2000)).
34 See, e.g., Robert C. Anderson et al., Cost Savings from the Use of Market Incentives for 
Pollution  Control,  in MARKET-BASED  APPROACHES  TO  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY:  REGULATORY 
INNOVATIONS TO THE FORE 15, 30-31 (Richard F. Kosobud & Jennifer M. Zimmerman eds., 1997) 
(discussing water pollution trading programs).
35 See  United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency  Office  of  Water,  Proposed  Water 
Quality  Trading  Policy  (2002)  (available  at 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/proptradepolicy.pdf).
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the use of the regimes to help regulate other environmental problems.
36
Tradable pollution permit regimes have also emerged on the international 
stage:  The  seeds  for  a  global  trading  program  to  curb  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  appear  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol.
37    Still,  command-and-control 
regulation  remains  the  dominant  form  of  domestic  environmental 
regulation; actual implementation of tradable pollution permit regimes lags 
behind their academic endorsement.
38
IV. THE “RIGHT TO POLLUTE” AND “COMMODIFICATION” 
CRITIQUES 
My  argument  that  framing  effects  can  influence  environmental 
regulatory choice rests upon the assertion of two critiques—the “right to
pollute”  and  “commodification”  critiques—to  certain  forms  of 
environmental  regulatory  instruments  but  not  others.    In  this  Part,  I 
explicate the two critiques in the context of environmental regulation.  The 
critiques are generally applied to the market-based regulatory tools—taxes 
and tradable pollution permits—with a particular emphasis on the latter.  In 
subsequent Parts, I demonstrate that both critiques in fact have applicability 
in respect of all the environmental regulatory options I discuss here, and 
argue  that  the  particular  applicability  of  the  critiques  to  market-based 
instruments is the result at least in part of framing effects.
A. The “Right to Pollute” Critique
Many  opponents  assail  tradable  pollution  permit  regimes  for 
creating a “right to pollute”.
39  The problem with the government creation 
36 See, e.g., David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the 
Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 405 
(1996) (suggesting the use of a tradable pollution permit regime for habitat conservation to preserve 
endangered species).  But see State Environmental Commissioner Urges Termination of Emissions 
Trading Program, 33 ENV’T REP. 2062 (Sept. 20, 2002) (New Jersey to discontinue its intrastate air 
pollution trading program).
37 See Nash, supra note 19, at 493-96; Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 111 (2001).  
38 See Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in 
the Information Age, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 94 (2003) (“Currently, [tradable environmental 
allowances] are in force only in very limited spheres, despite the enormous theoretical interest in 
them.”); Merrill, supra note 23, at 283-84; Stewart, supra note 37, at 24-25 (“[T]he basic system of 
command regulation established in the 1970s, in which environmental problems in different media 
are addressed in different, uncoordinated statutes, persists to this day.”).
39 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., What Good is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 197 
(2003)  (“[M]any  environmentalists  complain  that  market  mechanisms  are  mere  ‘licenses  to 
pollute’ . . . .”); James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55 MONT. 
L.  REV.  425,  432  (1994)  (“Most  environmental  groups  have  opposed  the  tradeable  emissions 
approach, generally on the ground that no one should have a right to pollute.”); see also Matthew L. 
Wald, Utility is Selling Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at 1A.  Barry Commoner 
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of “rights to pollute”, the argument proceeds, is that it functions to remove 
the  stigma  that  otherwise  is,  and  generally  should  be,  associated  with 
pollution.  
Steven  Kelman  delineates  three  constituent  reasons  why 
environmentalists might be concerned about government action that gives 
rise to a “right to pollute.”
40  First, the condemnation of pollution is “good 
intrinsically (or right in itself), because it can be seen as just that good 
behavior be praised and bad behavior condemned.”
41  The generation of 
pollution,  on  this  account,  is  an  evil,  to  be  condemned  along  with  (for 
example) racial discrimination and murder.  By creating “rights to pollute”, 
the government in effect endorses that evil.
42
applied  the  critique,  in  respect  of  the  proposal  for  a  national  sulfur  dioxide  emission  trading 
program (which later came to fruition), thus:
This is . . . a perverse parody of the “free market.” . . . [I]nstead of goods—useful things 
that people want—being exchanged, “bads” that nobody wants are traded.  It is a market 
that  cannot  operate  unless  it  is  provided  with  what  it  is  supposed  to  exchange—
pollutants.  This is a proposal that not only fails to prevent pollution but actually requires
it.
BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 188 (1992).
Steven Kelman provides empirical evidence of the prevalence of the ‘right to pollute’ view 
among Democratic Senate staffers and environmentalists in the early 1980s.  See Steven Kelman, 
Economic Incentives and Environmental Policy: Politics, Ideology, and Philosophy, in INCENTIVES 
FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  291,  303-04  &  tbl.  14.3  (Thomas  C.  Schelling  ed.,  1983) 
(describing Democratic Senate staffers’ general adherence to the ‘right to pollute’ critique); id. at 
311 & tbl. 14.5 (“Thirty-seven percent of environmentalist respondents mentioned the ‘license to 
pollute’  argument,  and  those  mentioning  that  argument  were  also  more  likely  to  oppose 
charges. . . .”); id. at 311-19 (describing the staying power of the critique).
While some commentators suggests that even environmentalists have essentially abandoned the 
“right to pollute” critique, see, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: 
Instrument  Choice  in  Legal  Context,  108  YALE  L.J.  677,  726  (1999)    (“Most  environmental 
advocates  have  indeed  given  up  the  ‘license  to  pollute’  rhetoric  over  the  past  fifteen  years, 
recognizing the effectiveness of incentives at controlling pollution and seeking instead the careful 
design  of  incentive  instruments  to  ensure  real  environmental  quality  improvement.”),  recent 
contributions to the literature continue to describe environmental groups as advancing the critique, 
see, e.g., Thompson, Jr., supra, at 197-98.
40 See STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46-53 
(1981).
41 Id. at 48; see generally id. at 47-48.
42 See COMMONER,  supra  note  39,  at  188;  Robert  E.  Goodin,  Selling  Environmental 
Indulgences, 57 KYKLOS 573 (1994) (drawing an analogy between market-based environmental 
regulation’s “sales” of pollution rights and sales by the Catholic Church of indulgences in the 
Middle Ages); see also Richard B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: 
Opportunities  and  Obstacles,  in ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW,  THE  ECONOMY,  AND  SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 171, 198-99 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2000) (describing and dissecting the 
argument); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1285 (2000)  (summarizing the 
argument,  which  Strahilevitz  opines  is  “too  simplistic  to  be  satisfying,”  as  asserting  that 
“[p]ollution is a bad thing, and the government should not approve of anyone’s efforts to produce 
it”).  
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Second, governmental stigmatization of pollution sends a signal to 
society encouraging citizens to develop pro-environmental preferences.
43
So, too then, may the absence of stigma send the opposite signal: “The 
‘license  to  pollute’  that  an  economic  incentives  policy  implies  may 
influence  citizen  preferences  that  gives  achievement  of  a  clean 
environment less weight—and hence lower the level of cleanup that society 
finally requires.”
44  Moreover, this effect may carry over to actors who are 
not subject to direct regulation by the government; thus, it is possible that 
actors who are directly subject to government regulation that gives rise to a 
“right to pollute” may reduce their pollution (as they are obligated to under 
the  regulation),  but  that  society’s  overall  attitude  toward  reduction  of 
pollution is less demanding, with the result that overall pollution in fact 
increases.
45
Third, Kelman argues that governmental recognition of a “right to 
pollute”  would  remove  an  incentive  for  polluters  to  reduce  their  own 
pollution:  “Stigmatization  of  polluting  behavior  will  tend  to  increase 
compliance with social measures to reduce pollution.  Stigmatization may 
also  act  to  make  polluters  realize  that  their  behavior  shows  insufficient 
43 See KELMAN, supra note 40, at 49-52.  This stigma may not translate, however, into strong 
pro-environmental norms that significantly affect behavior.  See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 
89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1295-96 (2001) (drawing on empirical evidence to conclude that the degree 
to which recycling behavior is convenient may incentivize the behavior more than a social norm in 
favor of the behavior).
44 KELMAN, supra note 40, at 49.
45 Bruno Frey argues:
The  sale  of  licenses  allowing  a  specific  amount  of  pollution  suggests  to  people  that 
pollution is not morally condemned and that once a license has been granted, a ‘license 
to  pollute’  has  been  acquired.    The  environmental  decision-makers  .  .  .  fear  the 
destruction of environmentally relevant intrinsic motivation spilling over into those areas 
where pricing instruments are not applicable . . . . People perceive the environment as a 
whole.    Decision-makers  fear  that  the  use  of  pricing  instruments  would  lead  to  a 
counterproductive effect: the quality of the environment is improved in those areas where 
tradeable  licenses  (or  environmental  charges  or  taxes)  are  applied,  but  environmental 
quality  is  lowered  in  all  other  areas  because  the  guiding  environmental  ethic  has 
weakened  or  has  been  completely  destroyed.    This  reduced  ethic  moreover  hampers 
individuals’ willingness to accept any kind of action to fight pollution, i.e.[,] political 
support for environmental policies would also be decreased.
Bruno S. Frey, Motivation as a Limit to Pricing, 14 J. ECON. PSYCH. 635, 652 (1993) (emphasis in 
original).
The potential for both command-and-control restrictions and ethical motivations to influence 
behavior is demonstrated by a sign in the Tulane University main parking complex elevator, which 
reads: “COURTESY IS CONTAGIOUS!  PLEASE PARK WITHIN THE LINES[.]  VIOLATORS 
WILL BE ISSUED CITATIONS!”  See also Charisse Jones, NYC Tackles Cellphone Etiquette: 
Legislating  What’s  Rude  Goes  Too  Far,  Some  Claim,  USA  TODAY,  Oct.  31,  2002,  at  3A 
(discussing New York City legislation that would have imposed fines on individuals whose cellular 
telephones ring during indoor performances).
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concern  for  others,  thus  changing  their  attitudes  and,  perhaps,  their 
resistance to environmental laws.”
46
B. The “Commodification” Critique
Opponents  also  frequently  raise  a  “commodification”  critique  of 
tradable  pollution  permits  regimes  and  certain  other  forms  of 
environmental regulation.  This complaint argues that tradable pollution 
permits  render  the  environment,  or  environmental  quality,  a  mere 
“commodity”,  and  that  that  “commodification”  is  wrong.    Despite  this 
general statement of the commodification critique, the critique in fact arises 
in different guises and with varying scope.
It is appropriate to begin an elucidation of commodification with a 
discussion  of  commensurability,  of  which  commodification  is  a  special 
case.
47  Essentially, two items are commensurable if there is a common 
46 KELMAN, supra note 40, at 52; see generally id. at 52-53.  
Compare  David  B.  Spence,  The  Shadow  of  the  Rational  Polluter:  Rethinking  the  Role  of 
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917 (2001).  Spence argues that the 
existing  environmental  regulatory  framework  relies  too  heavily  on  a  “rational  polluter” 
presumption—that is, the presumption that societal actors will pollute to the extent that regulation 
directs them not to, see id. at 919-31.  Spence suggests that many societal actors choose to reduce 
their  pollution  on  their  own,  and  that  in  fact  many  polluters  exceed  pollution  limits 
unintentionally—despite extensive and expensive efforts to comply—simply because the pollution 
restrictions established by government are too arcane and complex for strict compliance reasonably 
to be expected.  See id. at 931-77.  Based upon this, Spence argues that environmental regulation 
should be modified to take into account the average polluter’s good faith efforts to reduce pollution 
and to comply with government regulation.  See id. at 977-96.
Interestingly, if those who attach import to the stigmatization of pollution emissions for the 
development  of  proper  social  norms  are  correct,  then  Spence’s  argument  may  suffer  from  a 
circularity: Spence argues in effect that the fact that societal actors will not generally pollute up to 
the  limits  of  government  regulation  justifies  moving  away  from  a  strict  command-and-control 
regulatory approach.  Yet if the critics of market-based regulation are correct, then the persistence 
of command-and-control regulation is the very reason that societal actors conform to norms of 
pollution reduction.  If that is so, then, while the removal of command-and-control regulation might 
in the short run create greater governmental-private sector cooperation toward pollution reduction, 
it would likely in the long run lead to far greater pollution as a result of the removal of both 
(i) strict limits on pollution emissions and (ii) the resulting anti-pollution norms.  
Compare also Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 531 (2002).  Malloy advances the claim that traditional analyses of corporate 
compliance with environmental regulation have assumed, wrongly, that corporate decisionmaking 
is  monolithic.    Malloy  argues  to  the  contrary  that  environmental  decisionmaking  within  the 
corporate  form  is  generally  far  more  complex  and  will  depend  upon  exactly  how  the 
decisionmaking authority is vested within the corporate structure.  As such, the effect of external 
factors,  including  social  norms,  on  corporate  environmental  compliance  decisions  may  depend 
upon which individuals and/or divisions within a corporate are actually called upon to make those 
decisions.
47 See Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 1215-16 
n.3  (1998)  (“The  debates  about  commodification  plainly  are  related  to  the  debates  about 
commensurability.  . . . For instance, a belief in universal commodification would presuppose the 
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metric according to which they can be ranked relative to one another; the 
two items are incommensurable if that is not the case.
48
Commodification  is  a  type  of  commensurability.    The  fact  that 
something  has  been  “commodified”  means  that  it  has  been  rendered 
property-like, and subject to market-like transactions.  The commodified 
thing necessarily then is commensurable with other things like it, insofar as 
the things can be (effectively or literally) bought and sold for money; thus, 
dollar value provides the common metric that commensurability requires.  
In effect, the commodified thing is rendered, like the money for which it 
can be traded, fungible.
49
But commodification goes beyond commensurability: Property-like 
features  and  market-like  transactions  are  not  required  for 
commensurability,  but  are  critical  to  commodification.    Margaret  Radin 
elucidates the concept of commodification, suggesting two constructions of 
the term “commodification”, one narrow and the other broad.  The narrow 
conception  of  commodification  “describes  actual  buying  and  selling  (or 
legally  permitted  buying  and  selling)  of  something.”
50    The  broad 
conception includes “not only actual buying and selling, but also market 
rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they  were sale 
transactions,  and  market  methodology,  the  use  of  monetary  cost-benefit 
analysis  to  judge  those  interactions.”
51    Radin  then  defines  “universal 
commodification” as the broad conception of commodification “in its most 
expansive form.”
52  Universal commodification “limit[s] actual buying and 
selling only by the dictates of market methodology, and solving problems 
validity of commensurability.  More reasonably, one could believe that all values or reasons are 
reducible to a common metric of utility, pleasure, self-expression, virtue, or something else, but are 
not reducible to a common metric of a medium of exchange.”).
48 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 
(1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single 
metric  without  doing  violence  to  our  considered  judgments  about  how  these  goods  are  best 
characterized.”);  MARGARET  JANE  RADIN,  CONTESTED  COMMODITIES  118  (1996)  (“By 
commensurability, I mean that values of things can be arrayed as a function of one continuous 
variable, or can be linearly ranked.”); Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 
146  U.  PA. L.  REV.  1169,  1170  (1998)  (“Roughly  speaking,  ‘incommensurability’  means  the 
absence of a scale or metric.”).  The term’s precise definition is open to some debate.  See, e.g., 
Adler, supra, at 1170 (discussing three related, but distinct, definitions); Sunstein, supra, at 795-99 
(describing  the  contours  of  the  term);  cf. id.  at  798  (distinguishing  commensurability  from 
compatibility).    The  concept  of  “incommensurability”  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
academic attention.  See generally Sunstein, supra; Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).
49 See infra note 53 (discussing the link between commodification and fungibility).
50 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1987). 
51 Id.
52 Id.
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of  contested  commodification  by  making  everything  in  principle  a 
commodity.”
53
With the general contours of commodification in place, I turn to the 
particular subject of commodification of the environment.  Two questions 
arise: first, why commodification of the environment is thought to be a bad 
thing,
54  and,  second,  what  exactly  constitutes  commodification  of  the 
environment. 
Kelman offers the most thorough treatment of  the problems that 
supposedly  arise  from  commodification  of  the  environment.    Kelman 
identifies  two  “psychological  costs  of  using  the  market”  to  regulate 
environmental  protection:  the  “feeling-falloff  effect”
55  and  the 
53 Id.  Under universal commodification, “anything some people are willing to sell and others 
are willing to buy in principle can and should be the subject of free market exchange,” id. at 1860, 
and  “everything  people  need  or  desire,  either  individually  or  in  groups,  is  conceived  of  as  a 
commodity,” id.
In  her  book,  Contested  Commodities,  Radin  offers  a  more  formal  description  of 
commodification,  one  that  links  commodification  with  the  concepts  of  fungibility  and 
commensurability:
[L]iteral complete commodification is characterized by (1) exchanges of things in the 
world (2) for money, (3) in the social context of markets, and (4) in conjunction with four 
indicia  of  commodification  in  conceptualization.    Those  four  conceptual  indicia 
characterize  complete  commodification  in  rhetoric.    They  are  (i) objectification, 
(ii) fungibility,  (iii) commensurability,  and  (iv) money  equivalence.    Literal 
commodification and commodification in conceptualization need not be coextensive in 
practice,  but  they  are  loosely  interdependent.    Unless  the  market  conceptual  scheme 
(market rhetoric) were prevalent in the world, literal market exchanges could not have the 
meaning they do.  And unless literal market exchanges were prevalent in the world, we 
would not be able to operate inside the conceptual scheme the way we do.
RADIN, supra note 48, at 118.  Radin further expounds:
The indicia of commodification in conceptualization are related to one another, but each 
of  them  plays  a  slightly  different  role  in  our  understanding  of  commodification.  
Objectification relates to ontological commitment.  By objectification, I mean ascription 
of status as a thing in the Kantian sense of something that is manipulable at the will of 
persons.  Fungibility relates to exchange.  By fungibility, I mean at least that the things 
are fully interchangeable with no effect on value to the holder.  Fungibility may also 
mean  that  the  things  can  be  equated  with  a  sum  of  money.    If  fungibility  has  this 
meaning, it collapses into commensurability.  Commensurability relates to the nature of 
value.  By commensurability, I mean that values of things can be arrayed as a function of 
one continuous variable, or can be linearly ranked.  By money equivalence, I mean that 
the continuous variable in terms of which things can be ranked is dollar value.
Id.
54 That is not to say that it is the commodification only of the environment that is the subject of 
criticism.  For a recent extension of commodification (through cost-benefit analysis) that some—
but not all, see infra note 56—criticize, see Edmund L. Andrews, New Scale for Toting Up Lost 
Freedom  vs.  Security  Would  Measure  in  Dollars,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Mar.  11, 2003,  at  A11  (“In  an 
unusual  twist  on  cost-benefit  analysis,  an  economic  tool  that  conservatives  have  often  used  to 
attack  environmental  regulation,  top  advisers  to  President  Bush  want  to  weigh  the  benefits  of 
tighter domestic security against the ‘costs’ of lost privacy and freedom.”).
55 See KELMAN, supra note 40, at 57-69.
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“downvaluation  effect.”
56    With  respect  to  the  feeling-falloff  effect, 
Kelman  first  argues  that  the  necessarily  impersonal  nature  of  market 
transactions will tend to decrease the value of human interactions.  This 
will  have  the  effect,  he  continues,  of  decreasing  feeling-inducing 
behaviors—such as altruism and spontaneity
57—and increasing feelings of 
loneliness and distrust.
58
Kelman  identifies  three  essential  reasons  for  the  downvaluation 
effect of markets.  First, the feeling-falloff effect itself results in a loss of 
value.
59    Second,  goods  that  are  not  subjected  to  market  transactions 
because of a perception that they should be shared equally lose that status 
when markets are introduced.
60  Third, Kelman notes that “one is able to 
proclaim the special value of something simply by keeping it outside the 
system of markets and prices of which most valued things form a part;”
61 to 
subject  such  goods  to  market  transactions  would  cause  an  inherent 
downvaluation.
62
With an understanding of why critics see commodification of the 
environment  as  problematic,  I  turn  to  the  question  of  what  exactly 
constitutes  commodification  of  the  environment.    To  some, 
commodification of the environment entails simply engaging in activities 
that require one to assign values to the environment.  As her elucidation of 
56 See id. at 69-77.  Sometimes, however, commodification actually might make people realize 
how valuable something really is—either because the market value is higher than what people 
might have anticipated, or because of the realization that the market value does not in fact capture 
the item’s true worth.  Thus, for example, consumer advocate and former Green Party presidential 
candidate Ralph Nader supports a proposal to monetize the benefit of certain freedoms in order to 
determine whether the new antiterrorism security measures that would necessitate the loss of those 
freedoms are justified:  
“As long as they’re going to deal with monetary evaluations, I told them they should 
start  asking  about  the  cost  of  destroying  democracy,”  said  Mr.  Nader,  who  lobbied 
Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the [White House] budget office director, on the issue.  “If the 
value assigned to civil rights and privacy is zero, the natural thing to do is just wipe them 
out.”
Andrews, supra note 54.
57 See id. at 62-69; cf. William E. Nelson, Two Models of Welfare: Private Charity Versus 
Public Duty, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295 (1998) (suggesting that the shift over the last century to 
a centralized, government-dominated approach for dealing with the poor in the United States has 
resulted  in  a  decrease  in  charitable  giving  by  propounding  the  understanding  that  it  is  now 
government’s responsibility to care for the poor).
58 See KELMAN, supra note 40, at 60-62.
59 See id. at 70-71.
60 See id. at 71.
61 Id. at 71.
62 See id.  at  71-77;  cf.  Holly  Doremus,  The  Special  Importance  of  Ordinary  Places,  23 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 3 (2000) (arguing that the only way to safeguard nature is to 
protect  and  preserve  ordinary  places  and  things);  RADIN,  supra  note  48,  at  120  (“The  idea  of 
fungibility, even without commensurability, still undermines the notion of individual uniqueness.”).
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the broad conception of commodification reflects, Radin understands cost-
benefit  analysis  to  fall  within  the  purview  of  commodification,  broadly 
construed.
63  Indeed, since “[m]arket methodology includes a cost-benefit 
analysis,”
64 “a healthful environment” can constitute a commodity
65 under 
Radin’s conception of “universal commodification”.  Elizabeth Anderson 
similarly sees cost-benefit analyses undertaken in respect of environmental 
protection as an example of commodification of the environment.
66  Steven 
Kelman  sees  the  introduction  of  a  tax-based  environmental  regulatory 
regime  as  commodification  of  the  environment.
67    And  Radin  notes 
Kelman’s criticism of tax-based environmental regulation
68 in the context 
of equating “commodification” with the “[m]onetization . . . of clean air 
and  water.”
69    Frank  Ackerman  and  Lisa  Heinzerling  also  endorse  this 
view, characterizing cost-benefit analysis as “involv[ing] the creation of 
artificial markets for things—like good health, long life, and clean air—
that  are  not  bought  and  sold.”
70    Thus,  the  broadest  commodification 
critique  alleges  that  it  is  simply  wrong  to  engage  in  a  system  that 
effectively places a monetary value on the environment.  
But  the  commodification  critique  also  can  be  focused  more 
narrowly,  and  more  directly,  where  an  actual  market  exists.    Radin’s 
approach  acknowledges  that  the  commodification  argument  reaches  its 
zenith where “actual buying and selling” occurs.  Kelman takes the same 
position.
71  Thus, while taxes and tradable permits both may be considered 
63 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
64 Radin, supra note 50, at 1861.
65 Id. at 1860.  
66 See ELIZABETH  ANDERSON,  VALUE  IN  ETHICS  AND  ECONOMICS  203-10  (1993);  see  also
Katharine K. Baker, Consorting With Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural Resources 
and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 679 n.10 (1995) (using the term 
“commodification” “to refer to the process of characterizing and placing a dollar figure upon a 
good or value that is not generally marketable”).
67 See KELMAN, supra note 40, at 54-83.
68 Radin, supra note 50, at 1857 n.36.  
69 Id. at 1857.
70  Frank  Ackerman  &  Lisa  Heinzerling,  Pricing  the  Priceless:  Cost-Benefit  Analysis  of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562 (2002).  But see Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
On  Justifying  Cost-Benefit  Analysis,  29  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  1037,  1048  (2000)  (“[T]he 
commodification  critique  rests  on  a  mistaken  interpretation  of  the  formal  theory:  cost-benefit 
analysis does not price life, the environment, or any other irreplaceable commodity.  Rather, cost-
benefit analysis places a value on specific policies offered in specific contexts.”).
71 Kelman explains:  
Setting a charge means using prices to steer production and allocation, but when charges
are used there is (in contrast to a marketable rights system where “rights” to emit a unit of 
pollution would be auctioned off and subject to resale) no direct market exchange of a 
thing  called  environmental  quality.    Instead,  the  charge  ideally  would  be  set  by 
determining the price that would have resulted had there been market exchange.
The  full-blown  costs  of  using  the  market  occur  in  instances  where  prices  are 
established and where market exchange (with the attendant decrease in production of 
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“market-based”  forms  of  environmental  regulation,  tradable  permits 
accentuate the problems of commodification since only they require the 
existence  and  use  of  a  true  “market”.    Only  under  a  tradable  pollution 
permit regime is the  “‘right’ to emit a unit of  pollution . . . subject to 
resale.”
72    Only  a  tradable  pollution  permit  regime  creates  an  actual 
commodity, an alienable property interest, in environmental quality.
73
Thus,  the  commodification  critique  applies  generally  to  market-
based forms of regulation—that is, taxes and tradable pollution permits—
because  those  types  of  regulation  rest  inherently  on  some  notion  of  a 
market for environmental quality.  The implicit presumption is that other 
environmental regulatory instruments do not rest on any notion of market, 
and  so  are  not  subject  to  the  commodification  critique.    Moreover, 
proponents  of  the  commodification  critique  acknowledge  that  tradable 
pollution permit regimes are more subject to the critique than tax-based 
(and,  a  fortiori,  other)  regimes.    The  assumption  here  is  that  tradable 
pollution permit regimes, alone among environmental regulatory regimes, 
give rise to alienable property-based rights in the environment.
V. ECONOMIC REALITY AND THE CRITIQUES
In  this  Part,  I  subject  both  the  “right  to  pollute”  and 
“commodification” critiques to the light of economic reality.
positively valued feelings) occurs as well.  These would be relevant in discussions of 
proposals by economists for greater reliance on the market in areas such as health care or 
education.    They  are  not,  at  least  conceptually,  fully  relevant  to  proposals  for  using 
charges  in  environmental  policy  (although  they  would  be  for  marketable  rights 
proposals).
KELMAN, supra note 40, at 83.  See also GREGORY  ALEXANDER, COMMODITY  AND PROPRIETY: 
COMPETING  VISIONS  OF  PROPERTY  IN  AMERICAN  LEGAL  THOUGHT  1776-1970   183  (1997) 
(“Commodities are associated with freedom, but they are also associated . . . with alienation [of 
feelings and interpersonal relations].”).  But see Norman W. Spaulding III, Note, Commodification 
and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
293, 297-98 (1997) (noting that there is “complete commodification” only where the market sets 
both the ends and the means, and that current market-based approaches fall short of this in that they 
enlist the market only to set the means, not the ends (which are set politically)).
72 KELMAN, supra note 40, at 83.
73 See Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 657, 691 n.94 (1995) 
(“There  are  some  things  which  do  not  have  the  capacity  to  consent  to  the  process  of 
commodification and yet which may be degraded by that very process. There may exist strong 
feelings, for example, that the creation of markets in pollution rights encourages environmental 
degradation by making polluting activities permissible at a price.  . . . One can hardly defend such 
activities by developing an argument based on consent, for the environment does not have the 
capacity to consent.”); see also Oates, supra note 32, at 142 (describing Oates’ initial response to 
J.H. Dales’ proposal to implement a tradable pollution permit regime as “skeptic[al]” because of 
the perception that Dales was advocating that we effectively put the environment up for sale!”; 
Oates notes that his perception “was proved wrong”).
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A. The Economic Reality of the “Right to Pollute” Critique: The 
Ubiquity of the “Right to Pollute” Among Environmental 
Regulatory Tools
In  this  Section,  I  explain  that,  notwithstanding  certain  common 
understandings  to  the  contrary,  all  environmental  regulatory  approaches 
short  of  complete  pollution  bans  give  rise  to  some  form  of  “right  to 
pollute”.  Moreover, all these rights to pollute are, in one way or another, 
alienable.    Thus,  the  tendency  to  focus  the  “right  to  pollute”  critique 
against market-based regulatory instruments, and tradable pollution permit 
regimes in particular, is not grounded in economic reality.
I begin my analysis by considering tradable pollution permits, since 
these are most widely,  and most clearly, seen to give rise to  “rights to 
pollute”.    Indeed,  the  tradable  pollution  permits  themselves  seem  to 
embody “rights to pollute” as a property-based entitlement.
It is widely accepted that tradable pollution permits are a form of 
property.
74    The  common  wisdom  is  that  they  are  property  specifically 
because  they  are  tradable.
75    While  it  is  true  that  alienability  is  a 
74 Here, I mean “property” in the traditional sense, not “constitutional property” subject to the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.  Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000) (discussing the relationship between traditional notions of 
property and “constitutional property”).
75 See, e.g., James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449, 449-50 
(1994)  (Sulfur  dioxide  emission  permits  “have  some  essential  property-rights  characteristics.  
Chiefly, they confer entitlements to pollute, and these entitlements are transferable—they may be 
bought  and  sold  on  the  market.”);  Terry  L.  Anderson  &  J.  Bishop  Grewell,  Property  Rights 
Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top Down?, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 73, 
91  (1999)  (noting  that  the  Los  Angeles  metropolitan  area  trading  program  for  smog  precursor 
emission  permits  “created  .  .  .  property  rights”);  Franz  Xaver  Perrez,  The  Efficiency  of 
Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 515, 555 (1998) 
(“[T]he creation of tradable pollution rights as proposed in the academic literature or adopted under 
the  Clean  Air  Act  Amendments  of  1990  for  sulfur  dioxide  emission,  is  an  attempt  to  create 
individual  property  rights.”  (footnotes  omitted));  Clare  Langley-Hawthorne,  An  International 
Market for Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L.J. 261, 298 (1998) (“The theory of tradable emission permits creates a market for emission as 
externalities, and grants a quasi property right to the commons by granting what is, in effect, a 
license to pollute.”); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 300, 308 (1995) (“[J. H.] Dales suggested the government create pollution permits that reflect, 
in total, a pollution limit set by the government, and then allow firms to trade the permits as if they 
were  property.”);  Robert  W.  Hahn  &  Gordon  L. Hester,  Where  Did  All  the  Markets  Go?  An 
Analysis of EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 143 (1989) (“[R]egulators 
have defined a set of property rights and placed minimum restrictions on their use” in structuring 
tradable emission permit regimes.).
Borrowing  from  Richard  Stewart  and  James  Krier,  Carol  Rose  describes  tradable  pollution 
permit regimes as creating “hybrid property”.  See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: 
Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 163-64 
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cornerstone  element  of  property,  it  turns  out  that,  from  a  property  law 
perspective,  tradability  does  not  distinguish  tradable  permits  from  other 
regulatory  tools.    In  fact,  many  other  regulatory  tools—including 
command-and-control  regulation,  information  disclosure  regulation,  and 
tax-based  regulation—also  give  rise  to  property  rights.    Tradability 
separates  tradable  permits  from  other  regulatory  forms  only  in  that 
tradability renders tradable permits standalone property rights.
The  property  nature  of  tradable  pollution  permits  seems 
unassailable.
76    One  who  owns  a  permit  enjoys  many  of  the  standard 
incidents  of  property  ownership
77:    The  owner  has  the  right  to  possess 
exclusively the permit, to use the permit, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
permit, and to pledge the permit to creditors.
78  Even the Congress that 
created  sulfur  dioxide  emission  allowances  and  statutorily  purported  to 
disclaim  their  property  status
79  nonetheless  characterized  the  permits  as 
“quasi-property”.
80
Although the general view is that, in contrast to tradable pollution 
permit regimes, command-and-control regimes do not create property, the 
reality is that they also give rise to a property-based entitlement to pollute.  
The general misconception that they do not seems to arise from the view 
that  tradable  pollution  permit  regimes  do,  while  command-and-control 
(1998) (citing Richard B. Stewart, Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond , 13  HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
91, 93 (1990), and Krier, supra, at 449).
76 This “right” may, or may not, be subject to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.  See
supra note 74.  But that is true as well of “rights” under other environmental regulatory regimes.  
77 See A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A. G. 
Guest ed., 1961).
78 See  Daniel  H.  Cole,  Clearing  the  Air:  Four  Propositions  About  Property  Rights  and 
Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 114-15 (1999) (noting that, even 
though the statute that creates sulfur dioxide emission allowances under the national sulfur dioxide 
emission trading program includes a statement that the allowances are not property, the statute 
nonetheless “expressly recognizes property rights in emission allowances”); Krier, supra note 75, at 
449-50.
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (providing that a sulfur dioxide emission allowance constitutes only 
a “limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide” and does “not constitute a property right”).  
80 Henry E. Mazurek, Jr., The Future of Clean Air: The Application of Futures Markets to Title 
IV of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 11 (1994) (“[A] 
House Energy and Commerce Committee report issued during final debate over the [Clean Air] 
Amendments  stated  that  allowances  are  like  ‘quasi-property,’  and therefore  can  be  reported  as 
‘utility  assets.’”  (quoting  H.R.  Rep.  No.  490,  101st  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  366  (1990))).    “Congress 
further emphasized the durable nature of an ‘allowance’ when Congressman Mike Oxley of Ohio 
interpreted  the  statute  as  granting  “only  Congress  and  the  President,  acting  together  through 
legislation . . . the authority to limit or revoke allowances.’”  Id. (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. E360, 
E3672 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990)).  See also id. at 19-29 (discussing the development of the sulfur 
dioxide emission allowance futures market); Adam J. Rosenberg, Note, Emissions Credit Futures 
Contracts  on  the  Chicago  Board  of  Trade:  Regional  and  Rational  Challenges  to  the  Right  to 
Pollute, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 501, 518-19 (1994) (same).
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regimes  do  not,  allow  for  alienability  of  pollution  rights.    While  only 
permit systems feature independent alienability, both permit systems and 
command-and-control systems give rise to property-based rights.  Although 
it  is  true  that  alienability  is  a  basic  touchstone  of  whether  a  distinct 
property right exists,
81 the fact that command-and-control regimes do not 
allow for the alienability of any new property interest simply means that 
such regimes do not create new property interests that are separable from 
preexisting property interests; it does not mean that these regimes do not 
convey a valuable property right.
To  see  this,  consider  a  traditional  command-and-control  regime, 
under which firms receive permits to emit a pollutant over a given period 
of time provided that certain conditions (such as a cap on the total amount 
emitted, or the installation of a particular pollution reduction technology) 
are met.  The permits are not tradable.  Each permit inheres in the factory 
in respect of which it was issued; that is, if the stock of the company that 
owns a factory to which a permit has been issued is sold, the purchaser 
acquires the right to exploit the permit.  In this case, the permit clearly is a 
valuable asset to the factory owner.  Indeed, the permit has a value that 
presumably is amortized in the overall value of the factory.  In other words, 
a prospective purchaser of the stock of the factory’s owner would pay some 
additional amount if the factory has an existing permit above what it would 
pay if the purchaser would have to expend funds to obtain a new permit.
82
Thus, the permit constitutes a right that broadens the bundle of property 
rights  that  ownership  of  the  factory  represents,  and  it  is  a  right  that 
enhances the value of that property bundle.
83  Viewed from the perspective 
81 See,  e.g.,  Lynda  L.  Butler,  The  Pathology  of  Property  Norms:  Living  Within  Nature’s 
Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 929-30 (2000) (noting that the “[b]asic characteristics of 
property include . . . free transferability, or the right to alienate property (citing 6 AMERICAN LAW 
OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1-.4 (1952)).  But see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (Fifth Amendment 
property rights not removed by prohibition of commercial transactions in parts of bird legally killed 
before laws prohibited killing); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross 
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1673-74 (1988) (noting that 
the Supreme Court’s Takings jurisprudence has afforded low constitutional protection to the right 
of alienability). 
82 See Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution 
Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 70 (1983) (“[G]iving a firm a 
permit to operate a polluting facility if it is in compliance with regulatory standards conveys a 
limited property right.”).  Allowing the permits to be tradable enhances the value of the permits.  
See id.; see also id. at 72 (“[R]egulation of SOx emissions in Los Angeles [through, at the time, 
non-tradable pollution permits] has created a new property right – a permit to emit – that is half as 
valuable as the compliance costs that have been undertaken to meet existing standards and roughly 
ten times as valuable as the short-run efficiency gains to be derived from making permits freely 
tradable.”).
83 Along similar lines, to the extent that the tax code authorizes a corporation that purchases 
another corporation to benefit from the purchased corporation’s unused net operating losses, see 
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of  property  rights,  command-and-control  regimes  appear  as  pollution 
permit regimes under which the permits are not tradable separate from the 
underlying property.
84  In the end, moreover, whether the government in 
fact issues actual “permits” or not is of no moment; the property nature of 
the right conferred remains.
Thus,  command-and-control  regimes  give  rise  to  property-based 
“rights to pollute”.  An effluent-based standard authorizes pollution up to 
the applicable effluent limitation.  A technology-based standard authorizes 
pollution once the polluter has installed the requisite pollution reduction 
technology.  A cap on total pollution allows pollution up to that cap.  
Along  similar  lines,  an  information  disclosure  regulatory  regime 
also  gives  rise  to  a  property-based  interest.    Once  the  information  is 
disclosed, the firm has the right to pollute.  Moreover, to the extent that that 
right  is  a  valuable  one  (and  exceeds  any  costs  associated  with  the 
disclosure),  the  value  of  the  firm  will  have  increased,  reflecting  the 
addition of that valuable right.  As above, one can conceive of the firm as 
having obtained permits to pollute from the government (with the question 
of  whether  or  not  the  firm  in  fact  receives  actual  permits  remaining 
irrelevant).
Although they may not always be seen to do so, tax regimes also 
create  property-based  rights  to  pollute.    Specifically,  they  confer  upon 
polluters the right to emit pollution for each quantum of tax paid.
85  In 
effect, then, these regimes set up markets
86 in (nontransferable) pollution 
generally I.R.C. § 382, one would expect the sellers of the purchased corporation to have fetched a 
better price than they would have if the corporation had no usable net operating losses. 
84 This is in conformance with the notion I have advanced elsewhere, that to every tradable 
pollution  permit  regime  there  corresponds  an  “underlying  command-and-control  regime.”    See
Nash,  supra  note  19,  at  519.    In  structuring  a  typical  tradable  pollution  permit  regime,  the 
government  establishes  an  acceptable  ambient  level  of  pollution;  translates  that  level  into  an 
acceptable annual amount of emissions; divides that annual amount into a number of emission 
permits; and distributes those permits among polluters and other societal actors.  The government 
then  allows  free  trading  of  those  permits.    The  underlying  command-and-control  regime 
corresponding  to  that  tradable  pollution  permit  regime  comes  about  when  the  government 
undertakes all the aforementioned steps except that it does not allow trading of permits apart from 
the underlying property.  See id.
85 Cf. PAUL B. DOWNING, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 194 (1984) (“The effluent 
fee system implies that property rights are owned by recipients [of pollution damage]. . . .”).  This 
statement simply recognizes the fact that, before any taxes are paid, property rights to pollute reside 
with the government, acting as proxy for those who would be harmed by pollution emissions.  Once 
taxes are paid, of course, the property rights are transferred to the payors.
86 Traditional tax regimes generally apply a uniform tax rate, and thus set up “markets” that 
offer the commodity at a fixed price.  But this need not be the case:  It is possible, in theory, to take 
into  account  changes  in  marginal  pollution  reduction  cost  by  varying  the  tax  rate  over  time, 
although  this  may  prove  difficult  in  practice.    See  Louis  Kaplow  &  Steven  Shavell,  On  the 
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emission rights; this is no different in effect from purchasing additional 
units of a product on a spot market.  It is true that these pollution rights are 
not alienable separate from the underlying property, but they need not be, 
since any polluter always can opt to pay more in tax and thus to purchase 
additional pollution rights.
87
In  summary,  then,  while  only  tradable  pollution  permit  regimes 
give  rise  to  individuated  property-based  rights,  it  remains  the  case  that 
tradable pollution permits, command-and-control regulation, information-
based  regulation,  and  tax-based  regimes  all  give  rise  to  property-based 
rights  to  pollute.    Indeed,  it  seems  that,  insofar  as  all  these  regulatory 
approaches allow polluters to engage in some amount of pollution, all these 
systems give rise to property-based rights to pollute.
88  More generally, all 
environmental regulatory regimes, short of absolute bans on pollution, give 
rise to property-based “rights to pollute”.
89
Indeed, the realization that only a total ban on pollution confers no 
“right to pollute” truly undermines the critique insofar as, in reality, a total 
ban on pollution is both impractical and undesirable.
90  While pollution 
standing alone may be undesirable and might even be considered an “evil”, 
the fact remains that many socially beneficial activities generate pollution 
Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working 
Paper 6251; unpublished manuscript); Oates, supra note 32, at 139-40.  Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 
42, at 1251 (describing a system under which drivers may pay a toll to gain access to San Diego 
freeway express lanes, with the toll varying according to how much traffic is currently making use 
of the express lanes; “[t]he more traffic is in the Express Lanes, the higher the toll will be”).
87 Cf. Frank Snare, The Concept of Property, 9 AM. PHIL. Q. 200, 201 (1972) (“Some rules, 
although they regulate property, presuppose its existence.  Laws which tax property would be such 
as these.” (footnote omitted)).  
88 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for 
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 23 (1991) (“Many of us who teach property law think that 
all these control strategies [for regulating the environment] represent different kinds of property 
regimes, but conventional usage only calls the individualized right a property right.”); Cole, supra
note 78, at 105-09 (arguing that “all solutions to environmental problems are ‘property-based’”).
That is not to say that the value of the property rights conferred by the various systems is 
identical.  Indeed, it is likely that the values would be different.  For example, an independently 
alienable right is likely more valuable than a right that can only be transferred in conjunction with 
the underlying asset.
89 Wiener, supra note 39, at 724 (“[A]ll policies, except an absolute ban, amount to licensing 
some ‘right to pollute.’”); Nash, supra note 19, at 529. 
90 That is not to say that a ban on a particular pollutant is necessarily either impractical or 
undesirable.  For example, the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (1987), was designed to effect the elimination of emissions of 
certain ozone-depleting chemicals by parties to the treaty.  Still, a total ban on all forms of pollution 
remains impractical and undesirable.  
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as a necessary byproduct.
91  Society has decided—if implicitly—to balance 
the  benefits  of  the  socially  productive  activities  that  result  in  pollution 
generation  with  the  costs  of  the  pollution  itself.    There  is,  then,  some 
optimal level of pollution—that is, a level of pollution that maximizes the 
excess  of  those  benefits  above  the  costs—and  that  optimal  level  of 
pollution is greater than zero.
92  On this basis, Eric Posner identifies not a 
strict anti-pollution norm, but rather a norm “not to pollute ‘too much.’”
93
The  absolute  ban  on  pollution  that  a  strict  anti-pollution  norm  would 
mandate is neither realistic nor desirable.
94
Once one accepts the undesirability of an absolute pollution ban, 
one’s  focus  shifts  to  the  regulatory  system’s  method  and  extent  of 
allocating pollution rights.  From that perspective, tax-based regimes and 
tradable  pollution  permit  regimes  that  rely  upon  auctions  for  the  initial 
allocation of permits fare better than other regimes:  Those regimes at least 
charge  something  for  every  property  right  obtained.    In  contrast, 
grandfathering-based  tradable  permit  regimes,  command-and-control 
regimes, and information-based regimes distribute at least some property 
rights free of charge.
95
91 See  Stewart,  supra  note  42,  at  199  (“The  laws  of  physics  make  [pollution]  residuals  an 
inevitable  consequence  of  human  activity.    Zero  residuals  discharge  is  an  unattainable  and 
undesirable objective.”).
92 See Nash, supra note 19, at 523 n.222.  Still, there is likely to be great disagreement as to 
where that optimal level lies, and the question remains as to whether the government accurately 
might identify the optimal level.  See id. at 525 n.224.
93 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1735 
(1996).  Posner elucidates: “Firms are entitled to pollute a bit, especially when they employ a lot of 
people and produce valuable goods.  But if firms exceed a certain threshold of pollution, neighbors 
complain, consumers boycott, and so on.”  Id.
94 See Strahilevitz, supra note 42, at 1285 (“Nor is it accurate to suggest that in the absence of a 
trading system, social norms will necessarily dictate that every pollutant be banned. Obviously, the 
public is willing to tolerate some level of pollution and is unwilling to tolerate a higher level.”).  It 
is  thus  not  surprising  that  pollution  control  legislation  is  not  designed  to  achieve  the  actual 
elimination of pollution.  See, e.g., J. B. Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts 
and Bolts of Endangered Species Act “HCP” Permits for Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAW.
345,  349  (1999)  (“[T]he  Federal  Water  Pollution  Control  Act  .  .  .  does  not  leave  it  that  ‘the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,’ but rather that such activities are 
unlawful ‘[e]xcept as in compliance with’ the terms of the statute.” (quoting Clean Water Act 
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a))).  At the same time, even if the eradication of pollution is not itself 
viable, it can be identified—and indeed is identified in various pollution control statutes—as a 
societal aspiration.  See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (“[I]t is the 
national  goal  that  the  discharge  of  pollutants  into  the  navigable  waters  be  eliminated  by 
1985 . . . .”).
95 See Wiener, supra note 39, at 724 (“[C]onduct-based technology requirements and fixed 
performance  standards amount to a license to pollute for  free once the requisite technology is 
installed or the quantity target is achieved. Taxes and tradeable allowances, by contrast, force the 
polluter to pay for every unit of emissions, either by paying the tax or by forfeiting the revenue 
from the sale of the allowance. Thus, it is conduct rules and fixed quantity rules, ironically, that 
truly  license  a  right  to pollute  for  free.”);  Nash,  supra note  19,  at  509  (“[S]ome  form  of  free 
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Kelman acknowledges this response, but maintains that standard-
based  regulation  imposes  a  stigma  on  pollution  that  market-based 
regulation does not.
96  The tradable permit removes any normative element; 
the  legal  rule  is,  in  Saul  Levmore’s  terms,  “a  mere  price”  with  no 
sanction.
97  Kelman argues that standard-based regulation calls on polluters 
to do “‘the best they can’ to reduce pollution.”
98  Kelman’s argument on 
this  point  is  not  sustained,  and  its  basis  is  murky.    After  all,  if  both 
command-and-control  and  market-based  regulation  both  allow  certain 
levels of pollution, why is it objectively correct to say that command-and-
control regulation, but not market-based regulation, calls upon polluters to 
do the best they can to reduce pollution?  Indeed, insofar as tax systems 
and auction-based trading schemes charge for each unit of pollution, is it 
not more accurate to say that those systems call upon polluters to do the 
best  they  can  to  reduce  pollution?    While  Kelman  may  be  correct  that 
command-and-control  regulations  are  understood  to  impose  a  greater 
stigma on pollution and therefore to call upon polluters to do the best they 
can to reduce pollution, that normative perception is incorrect.   I argue 
below that this inaccurate perception results from framing.
99  Further, an 
inaccurate normative perception is something that perhaps can, and if so 
should, be changed, perhaps by public education, a point to which I return 
below.
100
A final ground on which one might hold out for the propriety of 
singling out tradable pollution permit regimes under the “right to pollute” 
critique is the argument that the “rights to pollute” to which a tradable 
permit  regime  gives  rise  are  especially  property-like,  and  therefore 
distribution of pollution allowances is imbedded (even if not explicitly) in command-and-control 
regimes.”);  cf.  Stewart,  supra  note  42,  at  198  (“[C]ommand-and-control  regulation  does  not 
stigmatize or send any negative signal with respect to the residuals that are permitted by command 
standards.    By  contrast,  [market-based  regimes]  impose  an  economic  cost  on  all  residuals, 
reminding sources that any level of residuals  may impose social costs.  This  message is  most 
evident  in  the  case  of  environmental  taxes.”).    Note  that  a  command-and-control  system  may 
impose only fixed costs on polluters, so that the per emission cost varies according to how much 
pollution each polluter in fact emits.
96 See KELMAN, supra note 40, at 53.  
97  Saul  Levmore,  Norms  as  Supplements,  86  VA.  L.  REV.  1989,  1998  (2000).    Referring 
explicitly to “courts”, though acknowledging that the point extends to administrative agencies and 
legislatures as well, id. at 1999 n.12, Levmore explains: 
Laws are more than prices when courts had expected behavioral changes and are annoyed 
to find no such changes.  Laws are less than prices when courts observe through repeat 
litigation that there have been no behavioral adjustments, and then reassess their original 
findings in a way that no yields to [the lawbreaker].  
Id. at 1999.  See generally id. at 1998-99.
98 KELMAN, supra note 40, at 53.   
99 See infra Part VI.
100 See infra Part VII.
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objectionable,  because  they  are  alienable.    This  argument,  too,  proves 
ultimately unconvincing.
While the common wisdom is that only tradable pollution permit 
regimes give rise to rights that are alienable, it is in fact not the case that 
tradable pollution permit regimes are the only  regimes that  give rise to 
alienable  property  rights.    To  the  contrary,  the  property-based  rights  to 
which other environmental regulatory regimes give rise generally also are 
alienable: They may be transferred along with the underlying property with 
which  they  are  associated.    Thus,  for  example,  where  a  command-and-
control regime vests a valuable property right with a factory, the owner of 
the factory may sell that right, along with the factory, to a willing buyer.
101
Note,  moreover,  that,  because  the  property  right  conferred  by  the 
command-and-control regime is valuable, the seller will receive more for 
its factory than it would without that right.  Thus, the factory owner is free 
to  transfer  the  property  right,  for  value;  the  only  restriction  is  that  the 
property cannot be alienated separately from the underlying property.
102
101 Some systems make alienation upon transfer of assets easier than others.  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.61(b)  (providing  for  “[a]utomatic  transfers”  of  National  Pollution  Discharge  Elimination 
System permits under the Clean Water Act to new owners or operators).  At the same time, even 
the Clean Water Act regulation does empower the Administrator of the EPA to “notify the existing 
permittee and the proposed new permittee of his or her intent to modify or revoke and reissue the 
permit,” id. § 122.61(b)(3).  See id. § 122.41(l)(3) (“This permit is not transferable to any person 
except  after  notice  to  the  Director.  The  Director  may  require  modification  or  revocation  and 
reissuance  of  the  permit  to  change  the  name  of  the  permittee  and  incorporate  such  other 
requirements as may be necessary under the Clean Water Act.”); id. § 122.41(g) (“This permit does 
not convey any property rights of any sort, or any exclusive privilege.”); Esther Bartfeld, Point-
Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 98 n.149 
(1993) (“In general, NPDES permits are not readily transferable.”).  
For a general discussion of transferability of environmental permits, see Maureen A. Brennan & 
Christopher W. Armstrong, Transfer of Environmental Permits in Real Estate Transactions, 716 
PLI/CORP 87 (1991).  The authors note that some permits may be more difficult to transfer than 
others, highlighting that state-issued permits may be subject to greater restraints on transferability.
102  Instructive  in  this  regard  is  the  opinion  of  the  United  States  Tax  Court  in  Beatty  v. 
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 835 (1966).  At issue in Beatty was a liquor license issued by the state of 
Arizona.  When the petitioners purchased their license in 1959, it was freely transferable.  Id. at 
836-37.  Subsequently,  in 1961, the state amended the law such that liquor licenses were no longer 
freely tradable, but could only be transferred “as part of a bona fide bulk sale of the entire business 
and stock in trade.”  Id. at 837.  
The petitioners argued that they were entitled to a loss for the purchase price as a result, inter 
alia, of the loss of the right to alienate their license.  The court rejected this argument.  It concluded 
that the change in state law had “not destroy[ed]” the right to transfer, reasoning that “the right of 
transfer could still be exercised, albeit only in connection with a bulk sale of the entire business and 
stock in trade.”  Id. at 841.  And, the court specifically noted that, “[s]ince the 1961 amendment, 
there ha[d] been transfers of [state liquor] licenses through bulk sales of entire businesses.”  Id. at 
838.
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Thus,  all  environmental  regulatory  regimes  (short  of  absolute 
pollution  bans)  give  rise  to  rights  to  pollute.    These  rights  to  pollute, 
moreover, are generally alienable, in one way or another.
B. The Economic Reality of the “Commodification” Critique: 
The Complexities of Fungibility and the Ubiquity of Cost-
Benefit Analysis
In  this  Section,  I  explore  the  susceptibility  of  the  various 
environmental  regulatory  tools  to  the  “commodification”  critique,  in  an 
effort to determine the proper extent to which market-based instruments—
including, particularly, tradable pollution permit systems—should be the 
focus of the critique.  First, I address the argument that tradable pollution
permit regimes are properly subject to the critique specifically because they 
give  rise  to  alienable  property-based  rights.    I  argue  that,  as  I  have 
established above, tradable pollution permit regimes are not unique in that 
regard.
Second,  I  address  the  argument  that  tradable  pollution  permit 
systems fall inherently subject to the “commodification” argument because 
they  necessarily  give  rise  to  standalone  fungible  rights  to  degrade  the 
environment.  There are two problems with this argument: first, a tradable 
pollution permit system need not be structured so as to give rise to purely 
fungible rights and, second, other environmental regulatory regimes can, 
and in practice generally do, give rise to rights to pollute that are fungible 
in certain ways.
Third,  I  consider  the  argument  that  market-based  environmental 
regulatory  instruments  are  particularly  susceptible  to  the 
“commodification” critique because of the explicit transactional mindset 
that such instruments develop.  I argue that other environmental regulatory 
approaches also can, and in practice generally do, incorporate a market-
based element—in the form of cost-benefit analysis as performed by the 
regulator.  I further recognize that the perceived attenuation between cost-
benefit  analysis  and  non-market-based  environmental  tools  serves  to 
confirm  the  greater  applicability  of  the  “commodification”  critique  to 
market-based approaches.  At the same time, however, I suggest (and argue 
more fully below
103) that that attenuation may be to some degree at least a 
product of framing.
103 See infra Part VI.B.2.  
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1.  Alienability
I begin by addressing the argument that tradable pollution permit 
regimes  are  especially  and  inherently  subject  to  the  “commodification” 
critique  because  they,  alone  among  regulatory  approaches,  give  rise  to 
alienable  property-based  rights.    But,  as  I  have  discussed  above,  other 
environmental regulatory regimes also give rise to property rights that are 
alienable—they are alienable along with the underlying property of which 
they are a part.
104  On this basis, moreover, a distinction can be drawn 
between  the  pollution  rights  and  other  items  against  which  a 
commodification  critique  has  historically  been  lodged.    Consider,  for 
example, blood.  Blood today is to some degree tradable as a standalone 
commodity, free and clear of the body from which it originates.
105  Still, 
blood  is  not  alienable  as  part  of  the  body,  since  the  body  itself  is  not 
alienable.
106  In this sense, property rights in blood—which arise only once 
the blood is separated from the body
107—are distinct from property rights 
to which environmental regulation gives rise—which are alienable along 
with  the  underlying  property  even  if  they  are  not  separated  from  the 
underlying property.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.  
105 The development of markets for blood was critiqued in RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT 
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
Note that, while blood is alienable as a standalone commodity, that is not in general true about 
other body parts.  See Radin, supra note 50, at 966 (noting that blood and certain other body parts 
are alienable, but also that most other body parts are not generally considered to be alienable).  On 
the  general  topic  of  alienability  of  and  markets  in  body  parts,  see  Stephen  Wilkinson’s  book, 
Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade (2003), and Julia D. Mahoney’s 
article, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163 (2000).  See also Heather R. Kolnsberg, 
An  Economic  Study:  Should  We  Sell  Human  Organs?,  30  INT’L  J.  SOC.  ECON.  1049  (2003) 
(questioning the long-run economic benefit of organ selling).
106  To  the  extent  that  a  system  recognizes  slavery  and  transactions  involving  slaves,  it  is 
possible for a body to be alienable.  Even there, however, there is a difference: The body would not 
be purchased or sold for the blood it contains, and the blood would not enhance the value of the 
body being traded.  Cf. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 105-13 (2d ed. 
1997)  (analyzing  the  question  of  slaves  as  property).    Markets  for  babies—another 
commodification the advisability of which commentators have debated, compare, e.g., Elisabeth M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) 
(advancing the notion of such markets), with Margaret Jane Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong 
With  Baby  Selling?, 26 PAC.  L.J.  135  (1995)  (questioning  the  advisability  of  such  markets)—
similarly present a situation inapposite to markets for environmental degradation.
107 See Radin, supra note 50, at 966 (noting that it “seem[s] appropriate to call parts of the body 
property  only  after  they  have  been  removed  from  the  system”);  J.E.  Penner,  The  “Bundle  of 
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 803 (1996) (“[T]he connection of our bodily 
parts with our bodies shows why they are not, in general, regarded as our property, even though 
they are clearly protected by duties of non-interference, and even though our rights to them are 
‘alienable,’ given that we can waive a right to right to assault, releasing others from these duties, 
say, to let a surgeon do a biopsy.  Until quite recently, technology did not prompt us to consider 
doing without them, much less passing them around.  We did not therefore regard our connection to 
them as contingent:  They could not just as well be someone else’s body parts.”).
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art53Framing Effects and Environmental Instrument Choice 31
2.  Fungibility
I  now  address  the  view  that  tradable  pollution  permit  regimes 
necessarily generate completely fungible pollution rights and, as such, are 
inherently subject to the “commodification” argument.  To be sure, under 
extant  regimes  tradable  pollution  permits  are  entirely  fungible.    To 
appreciate  this  extreme  fungibility,  consider  the  notion  that  tradable 
pollution permits result from the partition of preexisting property into a 
base asset and a permit or series of permits.
108  If partitioning provided the 
entire  explanation  for  the  genesis  of  tradable  pollution  permits,  then 
holders of property who received “grandfathered” permits would hold, if 
now in distinct pieces of property, the same “bundle of rights” that they 
held  before—or,  perhaps  more  accurately  in  light  of  the  fact  that  most 
tradable  pollution  permit  schemes  seek  to  reduce  the  level  of  pollution 
emissions, some proper subset of the bundle of rights they held previously.  
But  in  fact,  the  holder  has  something  more:  The  holder  now  has  an 
individuated right that he or she can sell independent of the underlying 
base  asset.
109    That  is,  not  only  does  the  holder  have  a  new  piece  of 
property that he or she can sell independent of the underlying asset (from 
which the permit originated), but the new asset is an asset that, if conveyed, 
will confer upon the buyer a new  right to do something to the buyer’s 
preexisting  property—that  is  to  say  that  the  holder’s  new  asset  is 
fungible.
110
108 Note that partitioning is not a necessary part of the genesis of tradable pollution permits.  
Partitioning  will  be  a  necessary  part  of  the  process  only  if,  before  the  advent  of  the  permits, 
preexisting  property  rights  were  understood  to  convey  to  their  holders  the  right  to  engage  in 
activities  that  resulted  in  pollution.    If  that  is  not  the  case—e.g.,  if  the  government  decides  to 
authorize activities that previously were prohibited or if the activity were not previously undertaken 
(not because they were prohibited, but perhaps because of insufficient technological support)—then 
the tradable pollution permits are completely new property.    For example, the government’s recent 
auctions of new broadcast spectra, see Nash, supra note 19, at 507, can be seen as the generation of 
new property interests, see, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV.  73,  75  (1985)  (identifying  “space  on  the  spectrum  of  radio  frequencies”  as  a  “‘fugitive’ 
resource” that has been “reduced to property for the first time”).  
Historically, however, that has not been the case; usually preexisting property rights accounted 
for the rights later authorized by pollution permits.  In the text, I focus on that more common setting.
109 This would seem to be a valuable addition to the holder’s estate.  But cf. Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51 (1979) (federal regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in parts of birds 
legally killed before laws prohibited killing did not trigger protection of Takings Clause). 
110  In  fact,  there  are  different  ways  in  which  property  can  be  fungible.    Below,  I  draw  a 
distinction between the fungibility that is the discussion of the present discussion in the text (to 
which I refer as “market-fungibility”) and fungibility based upon differences in damage caused by 
emissions in different places (to which I refer as “degradation-fungibility”).  See infra notes 113-24 
and accompanying text. 
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But that extent of fungibility is not inherent in tradable pollution 
permit regimes; it is, rather, a design choice.  To demonstrate this, I remain 
with  the  example  of  a  property  holder  who,  before  a  partition  of  her 
property, enjoys the right generally to use her property as she sees fit; I 
compare  the  situation  in  which  the  holder  voluntarily  partitions  her 
property
111  with  the  involuntary  partition  effected  by  the  creation  of 
tradable pollution permits with grandfathering.  Specifically, let us say that 
Wally, the owner of Whiteacre, sells Betty the right to remove lumber from 
Whiteacre.  As a result, Betty as the holder of that right has the right to
remove lumber from Whiteacre.  Betty does not enjoy the right to remove 
lumber from any other plot of land—not even from Blackacre, land she 
herself owns, if she previously has granted the right to remove lumber from 
Blackacre  to  someone  else.    In  short,  the  right  to  remove  lumber  from 
Whiteacre is transferable, but it is not fungible.
Pollution permit trading systems in theory could be structured in 
much  the  same  way.    Say,  for  example,  that  the  government  seeks  to 
regulate disposal of hazardous wastes by issuing permits to actors; each 
permit authorizes its holder to dispose of one ton of hazardous wastes on its 
land.    The  permits  are  tradable.    The  government  might  structure  the 
permits to adhere to the real property nature of the bundle from which they
were partitioned.  In this case, each permit would authorize its holder to 
dispose of one ton of hazardous wastes on the land in respect of which the 
permit originally was issued.  Thus, if Wally obtains a permit from the 
government and then sells that permit (unused) to Betty, then Betty (as the 
new  holder  of  the  permit)  obtains  the  right  to  dispose  of  one  ton  of 
hazardous  wastes  on  Whiteacre.    As  in  the  lumber  example  above,  the 
permits, though freely tradable, are not fungible—the right that each permit
conveys to its holder depends upon the land in respect of which it was 
originally issued.
But that is not the way tradable pollution permit regimes generally 
are structured: Tradable pollution permits are fungible.  Remaining with 
the  hazardous  waste  disposal  example,  each  permit  would  authorize  its 
holder  to  dispose  of  one  ton  of  hazardous  wastes on  any  land  that  the 
holder  owns.    Thus,  if  Wally  sells  a  permit  to  Betty  and  Betty  owns 
Blackacre, then the permit authorizes Betty to dispose of one (additional) 
ton of hazardous waste on Blackacre.  Under such an approach, all permits 
are  entirely  fungible:  It  matters  not  the  source  of  the  permit  that  Betty 
111 Law may limit the ways in which property holders may partition their property, at least in 
terms of the property interests to which the partition may give rise.  See generally Thomas W. 
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
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purchases—the  rights  she  obtains  by  virtue  of  her  purchase  will  be 
identical regardless of source.
If a tradable pollution permit regime is implemented that returns 
back to their original holders—i.e., grandfathers—all pollution rights, then 
a factory owner A can convey to another factory owner B a right that A
could not have conveyed to B before the partition: the right to use B’s 
factory more than B could have without the right.  Moreover, note that A
could not have conveyed that right to B before the partition even if A sold B
her entire interest in her factory.  That would only allow B to use what had 
been A’s factory; that transaction would have no impact on B’s ability to 
use  the  factory  that  he  had  owned  even  before  the  transaction.    Even 
though they originated as part of an interest in real property, the permits 
under this typical structure thus convey rights along the lines of personal 
property.
112  No longer are the rights tied to particular plots of land; the 
purchaser obtains the same rights, since the permits are fungible.
To this point, I have demonstrated that tradable pollution permits 
need not be as fungible as the common wisdom suggests that they must be.  
In  this  sense,  the  notion  that  tradable  pollution  permit  regimes  are 
inherently  subject  to  the  “commodification”  critique  by  virtue  of  the 
fungibility  of  the  permits  is  at  least  somewhat  suspect.    But  there  is  a 
further point on the fungibility score: While regimes other than tradable 
pollution  permit  regimes  may  not  give  rise  to  fungible  property  that  is 
exchangeable on a market—that is, they do not exhibit what I will refer to 
as  “market-fungibility”—still,  these  other  environmental  regulatory 
regimes can also, and generally do, feature a certain aspect of fungibility.  
They tend to exhibit what I will refer to as “degradation-fungibility”.
Before  proceeding,  let  me  explicate  the  distinction  between 
“market-fungibility”  and  “degradation-fungibility”.
113    Market-fungibility 
is the species of fungibility I have to this point been discussing.  It exists 
where pollution rights are separated from any underlying property interest, 
112 In this regard, compare, for example, how the use of a ‘profit a prendre’ can convert what 
had been portions of real property into personal property.  See, e.g., 63C AM. JUR. 2D PROPERTY
§ 21,  at  88  (1997)  (“[R]eal  property  in  the  form  of  mineral  rights  or  a  profit  a  prendre  is 
transformed into personal property when the physical substance is severed from the land.” (footnote 
omitted)).
113  Both  types  of  fungibility  square  with  Margaret  Radin’s  inclusive  understanding  of 
fungibility.  See RADIN, supra note 48, at 118 (“By fungibility, I mean at least that the things are 
fully interchangeable with no effect on value to the holder.”); id. at 118-20.  See also U.C.C. § 1-
201(17) (defining “fungible property” as property of which “any unit is, by nature of usage of trade, 
the equivalent of any other like unit”); cf. Schauer, supra note 47, at 1217-19 (noting instances in 
which  things  that  are  claimed  to  “the  same”  nonetheless  are  substantially  different  from  one 
another).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressFraming Effects and Environmental Instrument Choice 34
such that it does not matter which permit someone purchases; any permit 
would convey upon the purchaser the same rights.  Market-fungibility, as I 
have described above, rests on the validity of dissociating a right from the 
particular underlying property with which it previously was associated.  In 
other words, partitioning is a necessary prerequisite to market-fungibility, 
meaning  that  all  market-fungible  regimes  are  tradable  pollution  permit 
regimes.
114
Market-fungibility  is  to  be  distinguished  from  degradation-
fungibility.  I use “degradation-fungibility” to refer to a regulatory regime’s 
general failure to treat emissions that cause varying amounts of damages at 
different times and locations differently.  That is, a regulatory regime is 
degradation-fungible if it regulates two emissions of the same amount of a 
pollutant equally without regard to whether the location and extent of the 
harm caused by the emissions are the same.  
By way of illustration, the first hypothetical system that I described 
above  (involving  tradable  permits  to  dispose  of  hazardous  wastes)  is 
degradation-fungible  if  it  treats  disposals  of  wastes  that  cause  different 
types of damage (insofar as damage caused will depend upon the particular 
wastes  disposed  of,  as  well  as  the  features  of  the  specific  disposal 
locations) the same way by, for example, conferring on each landowner 
precisely the same number of disposal permits in the first instance.  More 
generally, any environmental regulatory regime may, and in fact many do, 
improperly  equate  actions  that  cause  different  environmental  harms.  
Command-and-control  systems  generally  treat  pollution  sources  in  the 
same way—or, to the extent they do not, they do not discriminate based 
upon factors likely to correspond to differences in environmental harm.
115
Environmental tax regimes generally impose a uniform tax rate and thus do 
not take into account differences in environmental damage that different 
emissions might cause.
116  Information-based regimes generally impose the 
same  disclosure  requirements  on  all  polluters  and  emissions  for  each 
pollutant.
117
114 Note that the converse is not true, insofar as the first hypothetical system that I described 
above (involving tradable permits to dispose of hazardous wastes) is not market-fungible.
115 For example, the Clean Air Act imposes stricter standards on new emission sources.  See
Nash, supra note 19, at 518.  But it is older sources that are more likely to be out-of-date and 
“dirtier,” and thus to cause larger environmental damage.  See id. at 515 & n.199.
116 But see supra note 86 (discussing the possible use of a variable tax rate to address this 
problem).
117 At the same time, one might expect that public reaction to the disclosure to be greater where 
the possible environmental damage is likely to be greater.  In that sense, the programs, combined 
with  the  public  involvement  that  the  programs  anticipate,  to  some  degree  take  into  account 
differences in environmental harm.
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Note  that  the  set  of  environmental  regulatory  regimes  that  is 
market-fungible  overlaps  with  the  set  of  regimes  that  is  degradation-
fungible, but also that the two sets are distinct.  As Table 1 reflects, there 
are  regimes  that  are  market-fungible  but  not  degradation-fungible,  and 
there  are  regimes  that  are  degradation-fungible  but  not market-fungible.  
Indeed,  not  all  tradable  permit  systems  are  degradation-fungible.    For 
example, an ambient permit system is market-fungible but not degradation-
fungible.    Further,  systems  other  than  tradable  permit  systems  can  be 
degradation-fungible.    For  example,  a  typical  tax-based  regime,  which 
imposes the same tax rate on all emissions of a non-global pollutant, is 
degradation-fungible (since it fails to treat differently pollution emissions 
that  cause  different  amounts  of  damage  at  different  locations)  but  not 
market-fungible; the same is true of a typical command-and-control regime 
that  ignores  differences  in  pollution  damage  caused  by  different 
emissions.
118
TABLE 1: MARKET-FUNGIBILITY AND DEGRADATION-FUNGIBILITY 






Typical Emission Permit 
Trading Regime
Yes Yes
Ambient Permit Trading 
Regime
Yes No
Hypothetical Hazardous Waste 




Typical Tax Regime No Yes




While market- and degradation-fungibility are distinct concepts, in 
practice  the  demands  of  market-fungibility  generally  encourage  the 
acceptance of degradation-fungibility.  Society enjoys the full benefits of 
pollution  trading—that  is,  cost-effective  reduction  of  pollution—only 
118 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental 
Law,  53  STAN.  L.  REV.  607,  624  n.36  (2000)  (“Proxy  choice  is  not  solely  a  challenge  for 
[environmental trading markets].  We do the same for traditional command-and-control regulation.  
The emissions from coal-fired utilities, for example, are limited in terms of tons of sulfur, not by 
the net impact from their release.”).
119 See supra p. 33. 
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where  the  regime  is  fully  market-fungible.
120    But,  unless  the  system 
involves  permits  for  environmental  degradation  (a  possible,  but 
complicated,  option),
121  the  permits  will  simply  represent  pollution 
emissions, and it is unlikely that two emissions of the same amount of the 
same pollutant from two different locations (and otherwise under different 
conditions) will have the same impact on environmental quality.
122  It still 
may  be  possible  to  allow  trading  among  polluters  located  within  close 
proximity  to  one  another,  on  the  theory  that  the  degradation  impact  of 
emissions from polluters located close to one another will be substantially 
the same.  But, even putting aside the problems with this approach,
123 the 
fact remains that the imposition of restrictions on the number of viable 
traders at some point may become so strict that they impede the viable 
operation of the permit market.  A solution to this problem is to expand the 
number  of  viable  traders,  but  this  can  only  be  done  by  increasing 
degradation-fungibility.
124    Thus  do  the  demands  of  market-fungibility 
incentivize increased degradation-fungibility.
The  distinction  between  market-  and  degradation-fungibility  is 
important because, while both forms of fungibility can serve as the basis 
for the “commodification” critique, only market-based fungibility seems in 
practice to be so used.  I return to the latter point below;
125 for now, I 
demonstrate  that  both  forms  of  fungibility  can  serve  to  ground  the 
“commodification” critique.
As  an  initial  matter,  it  seems  clear  that  the  applicability  of  the 
“commodification”  critique  is  at  its  zenith  where  both  market-  and 
degradation-fungibility  inhere.    Thus,  a  full-fledged  traditional  tradable 
pollution permit regime is the quintessential regulatory instrument to which 
the critique applies.
126
120 See,  e.g.,  Stewart,  supra  note  37,  at  111  (emphasizing  the  importance  of  a  “uniform 
homogenous commodity” to a successful marketable permit program). 
121 See infra note 133.
122 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 576-80.  Note that this is not the case for so-called 
“global pollutants”.  See id. at 576.
123 See id. at 616 (“No matter how much attention the policymaker devotes to constructing 
zonal  boundaries  in  light  of  topography  and  wind  patterns,  emissions  of  local  and  regional 
pollutants from different locations, even within the zone, are not equivalent.  Rather, they remain 
spatially  differentiated  and  will  have  somewhat  different  impacts  –  in  terms  of  location  and 
magnitude.”).
124 See id.  at  617.    James  Salzman  and  J.B.  Ruhl  describe  this  as  the  “inevitable  tradeoff 
between fat and sloppy or thin and bland.”  Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 118, at 645; see id. at 645-
47.
125 See infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
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Market-fungibility,  standing  alone,  also  can  serve  as  a  basis  for 
assertion of the “commodification” critique against a regulatory  regime.  
Consider, for example, the commodification critique in the context of the 
hypothetical  regulatory  regime  described  above,  under  which  the 
government issues permits that allow holders to dispose of hazardous waste 
but where the permits, though tradable, remain tied to particular pieces of 
land.  It seems that the critique is less applicable to such a regime, which is 
degradation-fungible but not market-fungible: After all, the regime has not 
given rise to a unified market for fungible pollution permits, but only to 
multiple smaller markets for particular pollution permits.  Still, the fact 
remains  that  actual  markets  in  the  permits  exist,  confirming  the 
applicability of the critique.
Degradation-fungibility,  standing  alone,  can  serve  as  a  basis  for 
assertion  of  the  “commodification”  critique  as  well.    An  environmental 
regulatory  regime  that  is  degradation-fungible  gives  rise  to  rights  to 
pollute
127  that  are  commensurable  along  a  common  metric  in  that  the 
regulatory regime treats these rights to pollute as equivalent (even though, 
from the perspective of environmental degradation, they are not).  
For  example,  a  degradation-fungible  tradable  pollution  permit 
regime “commodifies”, in the form of permits, something that should not 
be a commodity.
128  While equating emissions of global pollutants is not 
problematic,
129  emissions  of  local  and  regional  pollutants  are  “spatially 
differentiated,” meaning that the location and extent of damage an emission 
causes  will  vary  with  the  location  of,  and  conditions  surrounding,  the 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89 (all regimes short of absolute bans give rise to 
rights to pollute).
128  On  the  importance  of  degradation-fungibility  to  tradable  pollution  permit  regimes,  see 
Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 118.  As Salzman and Ruhl explain: 
[Environmental trading markets] must assume fungibility—that the things exchanged are 
sufficiently  similar  in  ways  important  to  the  goals  of  environmental  protection—
otherwise there would be no assurance that trading ensured environmental protection.  
While the precondition of fungibility may seem self-evident, this core assumption turns 
out to be more problematic than it first appears.
Id. at 611.
In fact, the degradation-fungibility mandated by the trading system may be wholly inaccurate in 
terms  of  the  actual  environmental  impacts—that  is  to  say  that,  in  many  situations,  the 
environmental degradation authorized by a permit may vary depending upon the identity, location, 
and other characteristics of the holder.  See generally id. at 629-31; Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, 
at 576-614; infra text accompanying notes 130-131.
129 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 576.  But see Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 118, at 623 
(“In the context of trades among greenhouse gases [(a global pollutant)], the ideal unit would be 
marginal  cost  to  society  from  the  emission’s  contribution  to  climate  change.    However,  such 
measures of utility cannot be calculated with any certainty so we rely on a proxy—in this case the 
emission’s global warming potential.”).
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emission.
130    Tradable  pollution  permit  regimes  for  local  and  regional 
pollutants thus create an environmentally-unsound commodity to the extent 
that  they  allow  for  unfettered  trading  of  permits  between  different 
locations.
131  So, too, can regimes that improperly equate emissions across 
time or of different pollutants give rise to improper commodification.
132
Moreover, such “miscommodifications” are not uncommon among tradable 
pollution permit regimes; rather, they are the norm.
133
130 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 576-80.
131 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 118, at 627-29.  
132 See id. at 629-30.
133 E.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 582-614 (describing how existing tradable pollution 
permits  programs  allow  for  generally  unfettered  trades  of  emissions  of  spatially  differentiated 
pollutants).
Environmental  economists  have  proffered  proposals  to  structure  tradable  pollution  permit 
regimes so as to address this concern, but each has its drawbacks.  Standard proposals include 
emissions  trading  with  multiple  zones,  markets  in  units  of  environmental  degradation  or 
(equivalently) ambient permit systems (the latter of which I discuss in the text just below), and 
pollution offset markets.  See id. at 614-24.  Emissions trading with multiple zones entails division 
of the regulated region into multiple trading zones, with the possibility of allowing no interzonal 
trading, or of translation factors for interzonal trading; the problem is that, to the extent that the 
markets  are  small  enough  seriously  to  address  the  problem,  they  may  be  too  small  to  sustain 
trading.  See id. at 614-18; Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 118, at 645 (noting the “inevitable tradeoff 
between fat and sloppy and thin and bland”); id. at 645-47.  Ambient permit systems feature of 
trading of environmental degradation, not emissions amounts; they require maintenance of multiple 
markets (in respect of the multiple points at which environmental degradation is measured) and, as 
such, entail substantial transactions and administrative costs.  See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 
618-21.  Pollution offset markets entail a “single market in emission permits but in which trades are 
not effected on a one-to-one basis,” id. at 622; they, too, give rise to substantial transactions and 
administrative costs; see id. at 621-24.
In short, all these proposals would tend to impose substantial transactions and administrative 
costs that may undermine the very market upon which the trading regime relies to achieve its goal 
of pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost.  Indeed, this is true for the one trading system that 
(by definition) does create the proper commodity—an ambient permit system, under which permits 
entitle their holders, not to emit a certain amount of pollutant, but rather to engage in an activity 
that result in the degradation of the environment at a particular location.  See supra note 121 and 
accompanying text.
Richard Revesz and I recently proposed a modified emission permit trading system that would 
retain  the  trading  of  emissions  but  would  constrain  the  harm  caused  by  improperly  equating 
emissions of spatially differentiated pollutants from different locations and over time.  See Nash & 
Revesz, supra note 24, at 624-28.  Our proposal relies upon a single market for emissions permits.  
Receptor  points,  and  acceptable  pollution  levels  at  all  receptor  points  (based,  presumably,  on 
concerns of health, welfare, justice, and practicality), would be chosen.  Approval of a trade of 
permits would require approval before the trade could be consummated.  Responsibility for grants 
and denials of approval would rest with a website, which would harness a pollution dispersion 
model.  All pertinent data regarding polluters (and prospective polluters) that the model required to 
predict  pollutant  concentrations—including  emission  locations,  stack  heights,  temperature  and 
velocity of emissions, and weather and topographical data—would be loaded onto the website.  
After  verification  that  the  initial  allocation  of  permits  would  not  result  in  unacceptably  high 
pollutant concentrations, the website would await requests for approval of trades.  In determining 
whether to grant approval for a trade, the website would modify temporarily its emissions data to 
reflect provisionally the shift in permit use.  The website then would use the dispersion model to 
predict pollutant concentrations in the wake of the trade.  If the model predicted that pollutant 
concentrations would be at or less than acceptable levels at all receptor points, then the website 
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Moreover,  degradation-fungibility  is  not  a  problem  particular  to 
market-fungible tradable pollution permit regimes.  As I have explained 
above, even a tradable pollution permit regime that is not market-fungible 
can  be  degradation-fungible.
134    And  so  can—and  generally  are—other 
environmental  regulatory  regimes.
135    For  example,  a  command-and-
control regime that imposes a uniform technology requirement on mercury-
emitting factories in a certain industry treats as equivalent the emissions of 
mercury that are allowed to continue once the standard has been met.  
To  the  extent  that  commensurability  is  a  cornerstone  of 
commodification,
136 it would seem, then, that degradation-fungibility might 
serve a basis for assertion of the “commodification” critique.  The fact that 
it  does  not  suggests  that  perhaps  framing  effects  shield  this  form  of 
fungibility from the common perception of regulatory regimes; I return to 
this point below.
137
3.  Cost - Benefit Analysis
A  final  point  in  relation  to  commodification  and  environmental 
regulatory regimes is that, while market-based regimes are singled out for 
giving  rise  to  markets  in  environmental  quality,  other  regulatory 
approaches can,  and in fact in practice  generally  do, make use of  cost-
benefit  analysis.
138    In  short,  both  market-based  and  non-market-based 
regulatory instruments place a value on the environment.
139
would grant approval for the trade and retain the modified missions data.  If, however, the model 
predicted that the pollutant concentration at any receptor point (or points) would exceed acceptable 
levels, then the website would reject the trade and revert to the pretrade emissions data.  Either 
way, the website then would be ready to consider requests for approval for other trades.
The system we propose would not eliminate the commodification issue, but would substantially 
limit  it,  and  in  a  way  that  would  not  give  rise  to  potentially  fatally  large  transactions  and 
administrative  costs.    See id.  at  628-33  (arguing  that  the  proposed  “constrained  single-zone 
emission  regime”  compares  favorably  with  other  tradable  pollution  permit  regime  structures).  
Thus, this aspect of the commodification issue can be addressed substantially by modifying the 
structure of the trading system.
134 See supra Table 1. 
135 See id.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
137 See infra Part VI.B.2. 
138 See,  e.g.,  Clean  Water  Act  § 304(b)(1)(B),  33  U.S.C.  § 1314(b)(1)(B)  (directing  the 
Environmental  Protection  Agency  to  consider  as  a  factor  in  determining  the  “best  practicable 
control technology currently available” the “total cost of application of technology in relation to the 
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application.”).  For a taxonomical overview of 
various statutory cost-benefit requirements, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1663-67 (2001).  
139 See supra Part  IV.B; Stewart,  supra note 42,  at  198  (Market-based  regimes  “deal  with 
limited rights to use common resources for disposing of residuals generated by socially productive 
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At the same time, it is true that markets and market rhetoric are 
seen to inhere in market-based regulatory approaches, while reliance on 
cost-benefit  analysis under other approaches seems far more attenuated: 
After all, it is conducted a priori rather than on a case-by - case basis, and it 
is conducted by the regulator and not by the societal actors who will make 
the decision as to whether and how much to pollute.
At the same time, however, the issue of framing raises the question 
of  the  extent  to  which  the  attenuation  the  result  of  perception,  and  in 
particular  prompted  by  the  frames  through  which  the  various 
environmental regulatory approaches are seen.  I elaborate on this point in 
the next Part.
140
VI. FRAMING AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CRITIQUES
The  previous  Section  analyzed  the  “right  to  pollute”  and 
“commodification”  critiques  in  the  light  of  economic  reality,  and 
demonstrated  that  the  “right  to  pollute”  critique  applies  to  all 
environmental  regulatory  instruments  short  of  absolute  pollution  bans, 
while  the  “commodification”  critique  can  be  seen  to  apply  not  only  to 
market-based  instruments,  but  to  other  regulatory  instruments  as  well.  
Indeed, Lior Strahilevitz dismisses the “right to pollute” critique of permits 
as  “too  simplistic  to  be  satisfying,”
141  while  Eric  Posner  implies  that 
marketable permits should be unobjectionable since they create a property 
right that is based upon “a firm’s norm-grounded entitlement to pollute ‘a 
little’.”
142
Nonetheless,  as  I  have  suggested  above  and  describe  in  greater 
detail here, economic reality seems to diverge from perception in respect of 
the  critiques.    The  prevailing  perception  is  that  both  critiques  apply 
particularly  to  market-based  regulation,  with  tradable  pollution  permit 
regimes  especially  susceptible  to  the  commodification  critique.    In  this 
Part,  I  identify  framing  effects  as  one  source  of  that  divergence.    The 
differing  frames  through  which  competing  environmental  regulatory 
instruments are presented, and therefore perceived, render some of those 
activities.    The  difference  between  [market-based  regimes]  and  command  regulation  is  the 
mechanism for allocating these usufructory rights.  The value that we place on distant vistas and 
clean water is the same whether the residuals limitations needed to preserve these environmental 
values are achieved through command regulation or through [market-based regimes].”).
140 See infra Part VI.B.2. 
141 Strahilevitz, supra note 42, at 1285.  
142 Posner, supra note 93, at 1735 (emphasis added).
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instruments more susceptible to the critiques than others, the reality of the 
situation  notwithstanding.    First,  I  describe  the  natural  frames  of  the 
various environmental regulatory approaches.  I then turn to the effects of 
those frames on perception of the devices.
A. The Frames of Environmental Regulatory Devices
I focus upon two aspects of framing: the framing of acts and actors, 
and the framing of outcomes.  By the framing of acts and actors, I mean to 
refer to the set of societal actors, whether public or private, whose acts fall 
naturally within the frame of the regulation.
143  By framing of outcomes, I 
mean to refer to whether the regulation tends to frame particular societal 
actors as experiencing a loss or gain by virtue of the regulation.
144
Two aspects of framing of acts and actors are salient.  First, market-
based regulations tend to frame their effects in a way that marginalizes the 
role  of  government:  It  relegates  government  to  issuing  pollution  rights 
upon societal actors, divorced of any substantial decisionmaking.  Second, 
market-based  regulations  tend  to  partition  the  pollution  emissions  of  a
societal  actor  from  the  socially  beneficial  activity  that  the  actor  is 
presumably undertaking.  I elaborate each of these points in turn.
Market-based  regulations  frame  their  function  in  terms  of 
individual cost-benefit-based decisions undertaken by private  actors; the 
role of government is deemphasized.  In reality, the government plays a 
substantial,  important,  and  active  role  in  establishing  and  administering 
market-based  regulation.    Under  a  tax  regime,  the  government  must 
establish, collect, and enforce the tax.  Under a tradable pollution permit 
regime,  the  government  must  establish  the  ceiling  for  overall  pollution 
emissions,  allocate  the  permits,  monitor  the  trading,  and  ensure  that  no 
source  emits  more  pollutant  than  its  holding  of  permits  authorizes.  
Nonetheless, the regimes are framed in a way so as to emphasize the role of 
individual actors—in terms of deciding whether to pay the tax and pollute 
more,  or  whether  to  buy  or  sell  permits—rather  than  the  role  of 
government. 
In contrast, non-market-based regimes frame themselves in terms of 
the establishment by the government of a standard (whether technological 
143 Cf. supra  text  accompanying  note  11  (describing  Kahneman  and  Tversky’s  concept  of 
“framing of acts”).
144 Cf. supra  text  accompanying  note  13  (describing  Kahneman  and  Tversky’s  concept  of 
“framing of outcomes”).
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or effluent) with which pollution sources must comply.  The focus is on the 
government’s relationship—as rule-setter and enforcer—with polluters.  
Market-based regulations tend also to frame their function so as to 
partition the act of pollution from the underlying activity out of which the 
pollution emission originates.  For instance, a tax regime focuses attention 
on the payment of the tax by a pollution source in return for the “right” to 
continue to pollute; little if any emphasis falls on the activity (presumably 
beneficial  to  society)  of  which  the  pollution  emissions  are  byproducts.  
This is even more the case for tradable pollution permit regimes, where the 
focus is on the purchase of permits in order to vindicate a source’s “right” 
to pollute more—or on the sale of permits that will allow the buyer to 
pollute more, in exchange for which the seller obtains money.  In short, the 
focus is on the exchange of the permits for money, and not upon the effect 
of the permit transfer on either actor’s ability to engage in their underlying 
societally beneficial activities. 
Although, as I have discussed above, all environmental regulatory 
devices create “rights to pollute”, non-market-based regimes do not put the 
focus on those rights.  Rather, the focus is on the factory (i) complying 
with  applicable  standards  and  then  (ii) continuing  its  business  with  the 
associated  pollution  byproduct  still  linked  to  the  underlying  beneficial 
activity, and therefore not subject to a separate and independent focus.
In  terms  of  framing  of  outcomes,  non-market-based  regulations 
tend  to  present  the  government  as  imposing  a  limit  or  restriction  on 
polluters’ preexisting freedom to pollute.  In this sense, to the extent that 
people are generally in favor of reductions in pollution emissions, these 
regulations are framed as achieving a gain vis-à-vis the status quo.  Even 
an  information-based  regime  that  does  not  itself  restrict  the  amount  of 
authorized pollution or impose a technology requirement does still impose 
a disclosure requirement; at worst, it comes across as continuing the status 
quo.
By  contrast,  market-based  regulations  tend  to  be  understood  as 
having  the  government  confer  pollution  “rights”  on  pollution  sources.  
From the viewpoint that pollution reductions are good, these regimes are 
framed as achieving a loss.  This is because the regimes’ frame implicitly 
adopts a reference point that is not the actual status quo: The reference 
point is that, but for the market-based regulation, polluters would have no 
right  to  pollute.    In  practice,  the  implementation  of  a  market-based 
regulatory regime almost always results in a reduction in total pollution as 
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compared to the status quo ante.  But the frame of these devices tends to 
obscure that fact.
B. Framing Effects of Environmental Regulation
With the differing frames of market-based and non-market-based 
environmental regulatory tools in place, I turn to the effects of those frames 
and the question of why, economic reality notwithstanding, the “right to 
pollute”  and  “commodification”  critiques  retain  particular  vigor  with 
respect to market-based forms of regulation.
1.  The “Right to Pollute” Critique
The  perceived  applicability  of  the  “right  to  pollute”  critique  to 
market-based environmental regulation but not other forms of regulation 
results from the different instruments’ frames.  In particular, three factors 
intensify  the  perceived  susceptibility  of  market-based  regulation  to  the 
critique: market-based instruments’ portrayal of government as conferring 
rights on polluters rather than restricting polluters’ behavior; market-based 
instruments’ depiction of government’s role as limited to conferring those 
rights; and market-based instruments’ perceived partitioning of pollution 
emissions  from  the  underlying  activity  of  which  the  emissions  are  a 
byproduct.  
First,  market-based  regulations  portray  the  government  as 
conferring rights on polluters, as compared with other regulatory forms that 
depict  the  government  as  taking  rights  away  from—i.e.,  constraining—
polluters.
145  This perception lends itself naturally to the characterization of 
market-based instruments, in contrast to other approaches, as conferring a 
“right to pollute” on societal actors.  
Reinforcing  this  characterization  is  the  second  factor,  that 
government’s role is limited under market-based approaches to conferring 
rights  upon  societal  actors.    A  typical  command-and-control  approach 
conforms to a standard Austinian conception of law’s role as a command 
from  the  sovereign  backed  up  by  legal  sanction  for  failure  to  achieve 
compliance.
146  In contrast, market-based approaches are seen to relegate 
the role of government to conferring “rights” to societal actors, with the 
societal actors enjoying the power to choose whether and how much to 
145 See supra p. 41.
146 See, e.g., James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International Rule of 
Law, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 533, 537 (2003) (“[John] Austin defined a law as a rule laid down by a 
sovereign power that can be enforced through a penalty for failing to obey it.”).  
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pollute.  The framing effect, then, is to portray market-based approaches as 
imposing “a mere price” with no sanction.
147
Third, market-based regulations partition perceptually the pollution 
right  from  the  underlying  property  right—i.e.,  the  underlying  beneficial 
social  activity  of  which  the  pollution  emission  is  a  byproduct.    This 
enhances the perception that the “right to pollute” that government conveys 
under market-based approaches is a right to engage in an activity that is 
divorced  from  any  beneficial  activity,  i.e.,  is  divorced  of  any  positive 
value.  In effect, the partitioning conceals the tradeoff that society makes 
by allowing some pollution in order to enjoy the benefits of the socially 
useful activity that generates pollution as an unwanted, but (at least at the 
present time) necessary, byproduct.  By removing the explicit tie to any 
underlying  beneficial  activity,  the  partitioning  encourages  a  focus  on 
standalone pollution, which seems more of a “pure evil.”  
This focus lends supports to the comparison, advanced by Robert 
Goodin, between transactions in standalone pollution rights (whether under 
a tax or tradable pollution permit system) and sales of indulgences by the 
Medieval Catholic Church.
148  There, too, there was a perceived separation 
between  the  indulgence  and  the  “bad  act”  for  which  the  indulgence 
supposedly was penitence.  The indulgence proved problematic because of 
the lack of apparent link between the indulgence and the “bad act”, which 
undermined the validity of the indulgence.
149
The view of pollution as a pure evil supports the comparison of 
pollution  rights  with  other  societal  ills  such  as  murder  and  racial 
discrimination.  The fact remains that pollution is simply not comparable to 
murder or racial discrimination.  Racial discrimination, for example, rightly 
deserves  societal  condemnation.    An  attempt  to  address  the  problem  of 
racial  discrimination  by  using  a  market  to  allocate  the  “right  to 
discriminate”
150 or the “right to murder”
151 would undermine the stigma 
147 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
148 See Goodin, supra note 42.
149 See id. at 580.
150 See Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1991) 
(parodying the notion of legislation that would establish a market for racial discrimination rights); 
cf. Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133 (1994) (describing how a 
market for racial discrimination rights could be structured, but recognizing at the same time such a 
system would “dilute the law’s symbolic condemnation of discrimination,” and that “economic 
analysis has no theory of the symbolic and education function of law”). 
151 Cf. Penner, supra note 107, at 804.  Penner notes:
[O]ne  could  . . .  devise  a  “right  not  to  be  murdered”  which  was  property  and  thus 
transferable.  One can imagine a society in which only nobles had the legal right not to be 
murdered, and where everyone else had to rely on the morality of their fellows or on self-
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that properly should be associated with discrimination and with murder, 
and thus is fraught with problems.  Some argue that a market in pollution 
rights (and, to a lesser extent, a tax-based regime) similarly undercuts the 
government’s condemnation of pollution.  But in fact, as discussed above, 
the two settings are quite different.
152  Pollution is a necessary byproduct of 
many  beneficial  activities  and  services;
153  racial  discrimination
154  and 
murder  simply  are  not.    Thus,  while  it is  appropriate  fully  to  condemn 
racial discrimination and murder, the same is not true of pollution.
155  It 
defense.  Imagine that some down-at-heel nobles discovered that they could legally sell 
their rights not to be murdered, and did so.  This is an example of an alienable right not to 
be murdered.  But while this is a case of imaginable property, it violates the concept of 
property we actually have, in terms of the role it plays for us.  We do not conceive of a 
property  right  not  to be  murdered  because  our  legal  right  not  to  be  murdered  is  not 
justified by a title, purchased or not.  Our legal right not to be murdered is based upon 
considerations about the universal status of persons.  A person is conceived as having the 
right simply by being a living human.  Such a right cannot be conceived as alienable any 
more than a person's life can be.  One cannot separate one's life from oneself, to abandon 
it, give it away, or sell it, because one is one's life, or at least, whatever one is, one is not 
the same thing without it.
Id.
152  See  Sunstein,  supra note  1,  at  263  &  n.195  (highlighting  the  difference  between  racial 
discrimination, which a flat ban appropriately suggests is illicit and signals that it is “the short of 
practice to be eliminated, rather than be brought to some optimal point,” and pollution, for which 
“there is an optimal level of pollution, and it is not zero, and polluting activity—so long as it is part 
of a legitimate business, and not an intentional tort—is not the kind of thing that it is appropriate to 
delegitimate as such”).
153 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
154  The  modifier  “racial”  is  important.    Once  we  move  beyond  the  setting  of  racial 
discrimination to, for example, gender discrimination, it may be that certain aspects of particular 
jobs make those jobs “necessarily” more appropriate for people of one gender than another; gender 
discrimination  might  be  described  as  “necessary”  under  such  conditions.    At  the  same  time, 
however, what might seem at first to be a “necessary” job qualification at one time might turn out 
instead to have been the product of (undesirable) societal mores that seemed necessary but in fact 
was only a preference.  See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 
1971) (rejecting the defendant’s argument, and the trial court’s holding, that the fact that passengers 
expected,  and  psychologically  required,  flight  attendants  to  be  female  constituted  a  valid 
justification for hiring only female flight attendants).
155 Cass Sunstein explains:
As  a  first  approximation,  a  flat  ban  on  an  activity  may  well  be  preferable  to  a  cash 
payment  for  resulting  harm,  assuming  that  there  are  no  transaction  costs  (such  as 
enforcement expenditures), when and only when the right level of the underlying activity 
is zero.  The right level of assaults and poisonings seems to be zero.  It would therefore 
be absurd to allow people to assault and poison others as long as they are willing to 
compensate  people  for  the  harm.    Such  a  strategy  would  be  inconsistent  with  the 
underlying goal of eliminating the conduct altogether.
By contrast, the appropriate emissions level for many pollutants is well above zero.  
For  example,  complete  elimination of  sulfur  dioxide  emissions would  cause  a  severe 
energy  shortage—one  that  would  dramatically  increase  poverty,  health  risks, 
unemployment, and inflation.  In this respect, a ban on sulfur dioxide emissions would be 
difficult  to  justify.    For  those  pollutants  whose  continued  emissions  is  necessary  to 
achieve desirable social goals, a fee, designed to bring about the optimal emissions level, 
makes far more sense than a ban.
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might seem appropriate to condemn the release of pollutants in the abstract 
with no connection to any benefit flowing therefrom, but the conception 
underlying  this  view  is  unrealistic.    The  appropriateness  of  a  pollution 
emission can only be judged in light of the benefit that results from the 
activity that produces the pollution as a byproduct.
156
Nonetheless, a market for pollution emissions rights makes it easier 
to  accept  the  notion  of  pollution  as  a  pure  evil,  akin  to  racial 
discrimination,  by  encouraging  the  conceptualization  of  pollution  as 
detached from any underlying beneficial activity.  In effect, a marketable 
permit system gives rise to a “disconnect” between the pollution emissions 
and the beneficial activity.  
These three framing effects blend together to bolster strongly the 
perception  that  the  “right  to  pollute”  critique  applies  more  strongly  to 
market-based mechanisms.  Not only does the government afford rights to 
polluters rather than taking them away, but (the perception continues) the 
government by doing so cedes decisionmaking authority to polluters.  And, 
further,  to  the  extent  that  the  partitioning  of  pollution  depicts  pollution 
emissions as purely negative, the conveyance by the government of “rights 
to  pollute”  confirms  the  notion  that  the  government  thus  sets  a  “mere 
price” for pollution without establishing any norm;
157 it seems as though, 
by conferring absolute rights to pollute, the government is abandoning any 
anti-pollution norm.  Thus, while Posner speaks of a “norm not to pollute 
‘too  much’”
158—and,  in  fact,  market-based  systems  are  consistent  with 
such  a  norm—the  framing  effects  make  it  seem  that the  government  is 
instead not endorsing any anti-pollution norm at all.  
2.  The “Commodification” Critique
Two framing features render market-based regulatory forms—and 
especially tradable pollution permit systems—especially susceptible to the 
“commodification”  critique:  first,  marketable  permit  systems  tend  to 
emphasize  the  individual  power  enjoyed  by,  and  decisions  made  by, 
societal actors, and to deemphasize government’s role; other regimes, in 
contrast,  tend  to  emphasize  the  government’s  role  as  rule-setter  and 
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 635-36 (footnotes omitted).  See 
also Stewart, supra note 42, at 199 (“The discharge within proper limits of residuals from socially 
productive activities . . . can by no means be equated with sin or murder or racial discrimination.”).
156 This does not mean that absolute bans of particular types of pollution should be precluded. 
See supra  note  90.    Indeed,  more  generally,  it  may  be  that  the  pollution  that  results  from  a 
particular activity is so harmful that the activity itself should be banned. 
157 See supra notes 97, 147, and accompanying text. 
158 See supra text accompanying note 93. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art53Framing Effects and Environmental Instrument Choice 47
enforcer.  Second, market-based  regimes  are seen to decouple pollution 
from any underlying beneficial activity. 
The emphasis under market-based regulation on individual choice 
and  action,  and  the  deemphasis  of  the  government’s  role,  foster  the 
perception  that  market-based  instruments  commodify  the  environment.  
While, as I have discussed above, non-market-based instruments also tend 
to rely, at bottom, on some version of cost-benefit analysis,
159 that analysis 
falls outside the frame through which non-market-based instruments are 
pictured.  But that is not the case for market-based regulation, where cost-
benefit analysis and, therefore, commodification are center stage.  Under a 
tax regime, the focus is on each actor’s decision as to whether or not to pay 
the tax and pollute more.  Even more so is the focus on private actors’ 
decisions to transact pollution permits under a tradable permit regimes.
The fact that market-based regimes are seen to partition pollution 
from  the  underlying  activity  exacerbates  the  commodification  problem.    
On  its  face,  the  analysis  shifts  from  a  balancing  of  the  benefits  of  the 
socially productive goods or activities against the costs of pollution, to a 
balancing of the cost of right to pollute against the profit that the polluter 
enjoys  by  virtue  of  the  polluting  act  itself,  divorced  from  any  societal 
benefit.  The partitioning makes pollution seem like a pure evil more akin 
to murder, the application of an economic framework to which, while in 
reality at least somewhat appropriate,
160 seems highly inappropriate.
The  foregoing  thus  paints  the  susceptibility  of  market-based 
regulatory  forms  to  the  “commodification”  critique  as  a  framing  effect.  
That conclusion conflicts at least somewhat with the view, advanced by 
159 See supra Part IV.B.2.  
160  While  Elizabeth  Anderson  adheres  to  the  view  that  cost-benefit  analysis  involves 
commodification of the environment, she does concede that the environment presents a different 
case from other areas where commodification has been seen to be problematic: 
Whereas we neither have a market in human lives nor regard human beings as economic 
resources,  we  do  have  markets  in  land,  water,  animals,  and  natural  resources.    Our 
dominant relations to these things are economic.  The choices people make as consumers 
of environmental goods are arguably more autonomous than the choices people make as 
sellers of their labor power.
ANDERSON,  supra  note  66,  at  203-04.    See  also  Sunstein,  supra  note  48,  at  786-87,  834-40 
(describing  two  coexistent,  yet  somewhat  inconsistent,  means  of  valuation  for  environmental 
quality and goods); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD.  217,  247-53  (1993)  (to  the  same  effect);  Spaulding,  Note,  supra  note  71,  at  297-98 
(describing both market-based approaches and command-and-control approaches as examples of 
“incomplete  commodification”  on  the  spectrum  between  “complete  commodification”  and 
“complete  non-commodification”,  with  market-based  approaches  “[c]loser  to  free  market 
environmentalism”); but cf. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 70 (critiquing the underpinnings 
and methodology of cost-benefit analysis).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressFraming Effects and Environmental Instrument Choice 48
proponents of the “commodification” critique, that market-based regulation 
inherently—and, by omission, other forms of environmental regulation do 
not—commodify the environment.  Three factors support the view that the 
applicability of the “commodification” critique is at least in part due to 
framing.  
First, Saul Levmore argues that the commodification critique as a 
general  matter  is  largely  instrumental.
161    He  explains  that  the  critique 
seems to persist precisely in situations where it is the case (or at least it is 
believed to be the case) that the collective weal will suffer as a result of 
trading the “commodity” in question.  As such, the critique “suffers from 
something of a circularity problem.”
162  Levmore’s view accords well with 
the notion that the applicability of the “commodification” critique results 
from framing: The way in which the effect on public weal is presented, i.e., 
framed, may fuel—or defuse—criticisms of the proposed commodification.
Second, as I have discussed above, most environmental regulatory 
regimes  involve  some  measure  of  cost-benefit  analysis.
163    But  the 
“commodification”  critique  is  commonly  leveled  against  market-based 
regulatory forms.  This suggests that the cost-benefit analysis present in 
other regimes simply falls outside the pertinent regulatory frame.
164
Third,  the  absence  of  criticisms  of  environmental  regulatory 
instruments  on  degradation-fungibility  grounds  suggests  that  the  extent 
and scope of  commodification may be affected by framing.  As  I have 
suggested  above,  one  would  expect  proponents  of  the  commodification 
critique to be piqued by degradation-fungibility—not specifically because 
of the possible development of “hot spots” themselves (though that raises 
161 See Levmore, supra note 31, at 115-16 & n.8.  
162 Id. at 115.
163 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
164 Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, and by Cass Sunstein, that tradable pollution permit 
regimes  are  preferable  to  other  environmental  regulatory  instruments  because  of  their 
democratizing  features.    In  particular,  they  argue  that  the  tradable  permit  regimes  enhance 
democracy by promoting a focus on the fundamental question of how much pollution should be 
allowed, as compared with command-and-control regimes that typically focus on questions, such as 
the appropriate technology to be required to achieve pollution reduction, that are far less accessible.  
See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 30, at 1353; Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America 
Through  Law,  25  SUFFOLK  U.  L.  REV.  949,  967  (1991).    But,  if  the  frame  of  market-based 
environmental regulatory instrument in fact tends to deemphasize the role of government, then 
Ackerman  and  Stewart’s,  and  Sunstein’s  reliance  upon  the  question  of  the  overall  level  of 
acceptable pollution as the focal point of market-based programs is misplaced.  Perhaps tradable 
permit systems do not effectively democratize if their frame does not put emphasis on that question.  
Cf.  Heinzerling,  supra  note  75  (questioning  Ackerman  and  Stewart’s,  and  Sunstein’s, 
democratization assertion on theoretical and empirical grounds).
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its own environmental justice concerns
165), but rather because of the fact 
that  those  who  promulgate  degradation-fungible  systems  value  the 
existence of a broad market over the selection of a scientifically defensible 
commodity.
166    Market  values  triumph  over  other  values,  the  natural 
argument would seem to lie.  Yet, the argument that degradation-fungible 
systems value establishment of a broad-based commodity over all else is 
essentially absent from  the commodification literature.
167   It thus seems 
that the frame through which environmental regulations (in various forms) 
are presented deemphasizes the question of particular environmental harm 
caused by emissions, with the emphasis instead on emission amounts.  The 
frame,  in  other  words,  affects  the  degree  to  which  the  regulation  is 
perceived to commodify the environment.
Third, in terms of the importance of a frame that emphasizes (or 
deemphasizes) cost-benefit analysis and commodification, a study recently 
completed by Kip Viscusi in a related area—corporate risk analysis and the 
award of punitive damages
168—provides a useful analog.  Risk is similar to 
pollution.  Like pollution, the absolute eradication of risk is unattainable 
and, moreover, undesirable.  Further, while there is much public rhetoric on 
the ideal of reducing risk,
169 in reality the public is quite willing to accept 
higher  risk  for  cost  savings,  i.e.,  for  the  benefit  of  making  goods  and 
activities affordable that would not be were risk substantially reduced (let 
alone completely eliminated).
170
165 See Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, at 580-81, 613 - 14.
166  Note  that  degradation-fungibility  meets  the  description  of  “fungibility”  as  an  indicia  of 
commodification in conceptualization offered by Margaret Radin.  See RADIN, supra note 48, at 
188; supra note 53 and text accompanying notes 115-17.  
167  A  Westlaw  search  of  legal  journals  and  treatises  for  documents  that  refer  to 
“commodification” and “environmental justice” or “hot spots” in the same paragraph produced 
only  five  results.    Vicki  Been has  suggested  that  environmental  justice  advocates  might  use  a 
commodification argument to assert that society ought not to allow people to sell their right to live 
away from locally-undesirable land uses.  See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? 
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 
1040-41  (1993);  Vicki  Been,  Compensated  Siting  Proposals:  Is  It  Time  to  Pay  Attention?, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 824 (1994).  Norman Spaulding discusses ‘hot spots’ under a general 
analysis of commodification and market-based environmental regulation.  See Spaulding, Note, 
supra note 71, at 323.  
By contrast, an article that presents a taxonomy of environmental justice concerns contains no 
reference to commodification.  See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,681 (2000). 
168 See  W.  Kip Viscusi,  Corporate  Risk  Analysis:  A  Reckless  Act?, 52  STAN.  L.  REV.  547 
(2000).
169 See, e.g., John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS. 
RISK:  TRADEOFFS  IN  PROTECTING  HEALTH  AND  THE  ENVIRONMENT  1,  1  (John  D.  Graham  & 
Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1997).
170 See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 168, at 548-49.  Viscusi elaborates:
On a personal level, the approach of accepting risk tradeoffs is implicit in our daily 
lives.    We  take  chances  all  the  time.    We  ride  in  motor  vehicles,  fly  on  planes,  eat 
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Viscusi studied the effect of corporate risk analyses on jury awards 
of  punitive  damages  in  the  context  of  automobile  safety  design.    In 
particular, he used surveys of juror-eligible citizens to try, among other 
things, to isolate the effect on punitive damage awards of the fact that a 
automobile  manufacturer  had—or  had  not—conducted  a  cost-benefit 
analysis in respect of a design feature that later led to injuries.  Viscusi 
explains that, ideally, one would want companies to undertake a systematic 
risk analysis rather than make similar decisions in a reckless manner.
171
But, to the contrary, Viscusi’s findings indicate that jurors tend to arrive at 
larger punitive damage awards when companies actually engage in explicit 
cost-benefit analyses.
172  As Viscusi notes, “[t]he resulting incentives are 
perverse.”
173
Viscusi  offers  “conjectures”
174  to  explain  the  facially 
counterintuitive  behavior  of  individuals  in  this  setting.    Among  these 
conjectures  is  the  notion  that  “[m]oney  and  lives  might  be  considered 
incommensurable.”
175    If  that  is  so,  then  “[p]eople  may  be  averse  to 
potentially risky foods, and live in an environment that is not risk-free.  Some tradeoffs of 
this kind are inevitable as we seek to strike an appropriate balance between the harm 
inflicted by risks and the benefits such activities offer for our lives.  The task for the 
individual is to make those personal decisions that confer sufficient benefits to outweigh 
the associated risks.
When faced with options that have different levels of safety, we often pay a higher 
price for safer products, though not without limit.  Millions of consumers purchase cars 
with antilock brakes and protective side air bags, but few of us have such an unlimited 
concern for safety that we purchase a tank-like Hummer vehicle.
Id.
171 See id. at 550.  Viscusi explains: 
[W]e want corporations to think about risks in a systematic manner and to undertake such 
calculations  to  ensure  that  there  is  appropriate  risk  balancing  that  is  sufficiently 
protective.  We all benefit  when corporations select the level of safety that correctly 
reflects our own concern with safety and the costs of providing it.
Id.  Viscusi elucidates that markets allow corporations to gauge the risk tradeoffs that consumers 
are willing to accept: 
The risk tradeoffs that we are willing to make in effect set the price for safety in the 
market  and  provide  guidance  to  corporations,  which  must  supply  the  products  and 
services we purchase.  If corporations generate products that create more hazards than we 
want to bear given the product price, or include unnecessary safety features that we do 
not value, then the product risk mix will not be successful in the marketplace.
Id. at 549.
172 See id. at 556-57.  Viscusi also found that jurors arrived at larger awards when companies 
used more accurate, but larger, values of life in conducting their cost-benefit analyses than when 
they used artificially low values of life.  See id. at 558.  Thus, the more sound the cost-benefit 
analysis, the worse the likely result for the company.
173 Id. at 588.
174 Id. at 586.
175 Id. at 587.  Viscusi also advances the possibility that the mock jurors might have been 
affected by hindsight bias.  In other words, the mock jurors might have seen the corporations as 
having  balanced  the  costs  of  improved  safety  against  people—now  identified  people,  since  an 
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explicitly balancing money against human lives.”
176  Along the same lines 
of the commodification critique of market-based environmental regulation, 
the argument proceeds, it is more acceptable to engage in risk tradeoffs 
implicitly  than  it  is  to  do  so  explicitly  by  undertaking  an  explicit 
analysis.
177    Thus,  Viscusi’s  findings  provide  perhaps  some  empirical 
support for the heightened applicability of the commodification critique in 
the context of actual market-like treatment.  
At the same time, Lior Strahilevitz advances his study of the effects 
of selling the right to use a freeway’s express lanes as empirical evidence 
that the “commodification” critique is not always present.
178  Strahilevitz 
analyzed a system whereunder drivers on the freeway in return for a charge 
gain access to the freeway’s express lanes as opposed to its local lanes.  
The charge varies with how many cars already are using the express lanes; 
accident has by now occurred—who suffered particular injuries or died as a result of the lower 
safety provided, whereas in fact all the corporation did was to compare the costs of improved safety 
with a number representing the statistical expected value of harm that would result if the additional 
safety feature were not incorporated.  See id. at 587-88.
176 Id. at 586-87.
177 Along these lines, compare Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt’s explanation for the vitality 
of customary or evolutionary approaches (as compared to, inter alia, market-based approaches) for 
the distribution of scarce assets.  See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 44-49 
(1978).  Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that customary approaches may be valuable because they 
allocate assets without many of the costs associated with explicit markets.  But they note that, while 
customary  approaches  “are  likely  to  reduce  and  even  avoid  the  costs  of  costing[,]  . . .  this  is 
accomplished by sacrificing honesty and candor.  Evolutionary approaches epitomize the fact that 
subterfuges do not extinguish the costs of costing, but rather transform them into costs in honesty.”  
Id. at 146.  Cf. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 748 
(1987) (arguing that such approaches are prescriptively questionable, and that the “subterfuge can 
bring us peace only for a while”).
Compare as well the Supreme Court’s holding in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457 (2001), that the plain language of the Clean Air Act precludes the EPA from considering 
costs in setting national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”), see id. at 471, with the Court’s 
indication that “secret[] consider[ation]” of costs would have to be tolerated (though it would be 
inconsistent  with  the  Court’s  holding),  id.  at  471  n.4.    The  Court  explained:  “Respondents’ 
speculation that the EPA is secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone is 
irrelevant to our interpretive inquiry.  If such an allegation could be proved, it would be grounds for 
vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator had not followed the law.”  Id. at 471 n.4.  Of 
course, if in fact EPA indeed considered costs “without telling anyone,” it would be difficult for 
“such an allegation [to] be proved.”  By placing the burden of proof on challengers, the Court in 
effect provides greater protection for EPA’s covert, as opposed to explicit, considerations of cost.
A distinct, yet somewhat related, point is made by Laurence Tribe in his critique of the notion 
of having juries rely too heavily upon mathematical methods.  One objection that Tribe raises to 
such an approach is that it may dehumanize justice.  See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1375-77 (1971).  Tribe suggests 
that extensive reliance on mathematics may render the legal system “even more alien and inhuman 
than it already does to distressingly many.”  Id. at 1376.  He also argues that such an approach will 
serve only to “shroud[] the [legal] process in mathematical obscurity,” thus rendering the trial 
process and trial outcomes less, not more, comprehensible.  Id.
178 See Strahilevitz, supra note 42.  
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higher  usage  leads  to  a  higher  user  charge.
179    Strahilevitz  found  that 
people’s behavior under the system does not conform to what proponents 
of the commodification critique might predict.
180  Strahilevitz argues that 
the freeway-express lane example is substantially analogous to the use of 
marketable permits to regulate environmental quality.
181
But Strahilevitz’s analogy to pollution permits is not a strong one in 
two important ways.  First, those who choose to do so pay a one-time fee, 
upon  admission,  to  use  the  express  lanes.    Once  they  have  gained 
admission, they cannot sell their use right to anyone else.
182  Indeed, new
users purchase their use right from the government, not from existing users 
who are exiting the lanes.  In this sense, the San Diego freeway-express 
lane example is more akin to a variable tax scheme than to a marketable 
permit scheme.
183   No private party enjoys the opportunity to profit by 
transacting in express lane use rights.
184  In short, the system produces no 
opportunity for “winners” to enjoy an economic profit. 
In contrast, the case of punitive damages in the wake or absence of 
corporate risk analyses is a setting where there are private party winners.  
Automobile manufacturers may be viewed (at least after the fact) as having 
profited at the expense of those injured or killed in accidents.  In short, the 
179 Id. at 1251.  But note that there is only a one-time charge upon admission.  See id.
180 Strahilevitz explains:
The FasTrak experience does not support the argument that a move from a legal regime 
prohibiting an undesirable activity to one that commodifies the activity will undermine 
the norm against that behavior.  San Diego’s increase in carpooling during the life of the 
program  suggests  that,  if  anything,  the  norm  against  solo  commuting  has  become 
somewhat stronger.  Carpoolers have not felt that by commodifying their contribution to 
diminished roadway congestion FasTrak has trivialized their activities.  To the contrary, 
it appears that those drivers who carpooled before the FasTrak program began to feel that 
society was providing them with a greater reward then it did beforehand.  
Id. at 1289.  See id. at 1289-90.
181 See id. at 1288-91.
182 Strahilevitz recognizes this, but does not think the distinction is ultimately salient to the 
question of commodification: 
An important distinction [between tradable pollution permits and the San Diego freeway-
express lane example] concerns the fact that the right for solo drivers to use the Express 
Lanes is not, at present, alienable.  The analysis herein, however, suggests that this lack 
of alienability makes little difference with respect to norms.  Indeed, if anything, making 
access to the Express Lanes alienable might make carpoolers feel that their activities are 
valued by the state to an even greater degree, since they could then opt for either time or 
monetary savings as a result of their carpooling choice.
Id. at 1288 n.286. 
183 See supra note 86. 
184 Cf. Levmore, supra note 31, at 114 (describing the basis of the “anti-commodification” 
object to vote-selling as the “the idea that voting is a kind of collective decisionmaking experience, 
greater than the sum of individual votes, so that something important is lost if an isolated voting 
right is sold for the individual seller’s selfish gain”).
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risk analysis setting seems much more hospitable to the commodification 
critique than does the freeway-express lane setting.  The setting of tradable 
pollution permits also can be characterized to raise the specter of private 
party  winners.    Thus,  it,  too,  seems  more  susceptible  to  the 
commodification critique.
More  important,  the  “commodity”  that  Strahilevitz  studied—
roadway  usage—differs  from  the  “commodity”  of  tradable  permit 
systems—environmental  degradation—in  that  roadway  usage  is  not, 
standing  alone,  seen  to  be  a  pure  evil.    By  contrast,  environmental 
degradation—at least standing alone—is seen as a pure evil.  There is, in 
short,  no  partitioning  of  roadway  usage  from  an  underlying  beneficial 
activity  such  that  the  commodification  of  roadway  usage  seems 
problematic.    (There  might  more  of  a  problem  if,  for  example,  the 
government issued, instead of roadway usage permits, permits to emit a 
certain amount of carbon monoxide which it then required drivers to have 
before they get operate their motor vehicles.)
In sum, framing  effects do enhance the susceptibility of market-
based  forms  of  environmental  regulation  to  the  “right  to  pollute”  and 
“commodification” critiques.  In the next Part, I turn to the question of 
whether, and if so how, the force of these critiques might be blunted by 
altering the regulations’ frames.  
VII. REFRAMING AS A MEANS TO DEFUSE CRITIQUES OF MARKET-
BASED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
In  the  previous  Part,  I  described  the  “right  to  pollute”  and 
“commodification”  critiques  of  market-based  environmental  regulatory 
systems as effects of the frames through which market-based systems are 
portrayed.    The  fact  that  these  critiques  are,  to  some  degree  at  least, 
framing effects suggests that perhaps those effects might be minimized by 
altering the frames.  I address that question in this Part.
The frame through which a regulation is presented, and the effects 
of that frame, might be altered either through education of the public to 
broaden the regulation’s natural frame, or by changing the very frame of 
the regulation itself.  Thus, one possibility is directly to instruct the public 
as to how these schemes are supposed to function,
185 and to demonstrate 
185 See Nash, supra note 19, at 531 (suggesting that the argument might be largely defused by 
having the government “explain[] to the public how [the] tradable pollution allowance regime is 
supposed to function”); see generally id.
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that  they  in  fact  do  not  compromise  the  government’s  commitment  to 
environmental protection.
186
Another avenue would be to alter the frame itself by changing the 
nomenclature  of  market-based  systems.    For  example,  tradable  permit 
systems generally refer to the rights they create as emissions permits or 
allowances.  While the systems often disclaim the property nature of the 
allowances
187—in part to address the concern that the system is creating 
“property  rights  to  pollute”
188—the  fact  remains  that  the  allowances’ 
moniker connotes an absolute right to emit a certain amount of pollutant.
189
To  address  this  problem,  Carol  Rose  has  suggested  that  permits 
instead be dubbed “emissions debits” or “emissions penalties”.
190  Perhaps 
a more satisfying—and more effective—approach would be to focus the 
permit’s moniker on the right to use the underlying property in a way that 
results  in  generation  of  pollution  as  a  byproduct.
191    Such  an  approach 
would  retain  the  notion  that  the  pollution  emission  ties  back  to  some 
beneficial activity, despite the partitioning of the pollution “right” from the 
underlying property right.  It also would serve to emphasize the fact that
other forms of environmental regulation also balance pollution emissions 
against  beneficial  activities,  and  thus  themselves  engage  in 
commodification.
It is possible that, as a result of cumulative framing effects to this 
point, an anti-market-based norm has developed and ensconced itself.  If 
that is true, then simple education or relabeling of programs will likely not 
186 The promise of education as a tool is supported by the fact that society has acclimated over 
time  in  other  contexts  to  new  independent  property  rights  that  originally  drew  significant 
opposition.  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal 
Culture,  66  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  273,  333-35  (1991)  (describing  the  successful  expansion,  over 
opposition, of new forms of intangible property in Great Britain and the United States).
187 For example, the statutory scheme in the Clean Air Act explicitly provides that a sulfur 
dioxide emission allowance constitutes only a “limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide,” and 
does “not constitute a property right.”  42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1994).  
188 Congress evidently adopted this approach both to provide leeway were it to decide in the 
future  to  modify  or  eliminate  the  rights  conveyed  by  the  allowances,  and  to  minimize  the 
appearance of conveying property interests in a “right to pollute.”  Nash & Revesz, supra note 24, 
at 584 n.73.
189 Indeed, one might argue that the current nomenclature—if not the current state of the law 
itself—suggests that a polluter who possesses an emissions allowance could emit the amount of the 
pollutant even if the polluter was engaged in no beneficial activity, i.e., the polluter could simply 
open a canister of air pollutant for no reason other than that she was legally authorized to do so.  A 
change in the nomenclature would dispel, properly, any suggestion that such behavior would be 
tolerated (let alone authorized).
190 Rose, supra note 88, at 36.
191 Thus, a more accurate, though perhaps too cumbersome, moniker might be “permit to use 
property in a way that results in an incidental pollution emission”.
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be successful in overcoming objections to market-based regulation.  More 




In  this  Article,  I  have  argued  that  the  different  frames  through 
which  different  regulatory  instruments  are  presented  may  affect  the 
perception  of  those  instruments,  and  in  turn  may  influence  the  choice 
among  those  instruments.    I  have  used  the  “right  to  pollute”  and 
“commodification” critiques that are typically lodged against market-based 
environmental regulatory systems as an example.  The critiques in reality 
apply to most environmental regulatory tools,  yet the perception is that 
they  do  not.    I  have  argued  that  three  aspects  of  regulatory  framing—
market-based  regulations’  emphasis  on  individual  actors  as  opposed  to 
government, their partitioning of pollution emissions from the underlying 
beneficial activity, and their portrayal of polluters as gaining, rather than 
surrendering, rights—contribute to this perception, such that the perceived 
susceptibility of market-based instruments to these critiques is at least in 
part a framing effect.  I have also suggested some ways that the framing 
effects might be mitigated.
This Article provides three important lessons.  First, at least some 
of  the  objections  to  market-based  environmental  regulation  result  from 
framing.    Mitigation  of  these  framing  effects  might  make  enactment  of 
market-based regulation more politically viable.  
Second,  on  a  broader  level,  an  understanding  of  the 
“commodification” critique of market-based environmental regulation as a 
framing effect suggests that perhaps other applications of that critique also 
might result from framing.  In this sense, framing effects may shed light on 
the proper scope of “commodification”, a scope that has proven difficult to 
understand.
193
192 Cf. Posner, supra note 93, at 1730-31 (discussing the possible use of education to alter 
people’s  norms).    But  cf. id.  at  1734-35  (noting  that,  because  “[n]o  amount  of  education  and 
government-sponsored television commercials are going to prevent paper mills from spewing forth 
pollution,” the answer instead was to “circumvent” the “weak norm” against polluting the air by 
“transform[ing] a firm’s norm-grounded entitlement to pollute ‘a little’ into a property right that 
can be traded on the market”).
193 See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 31, at 115-16 & n.8; I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of 
Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 
(2003).  
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Third, speaking even more broadly, the importance of framing on 
environmental regulatory instrument choice indicates that framing effects 
may play an important role in instrument choice generally.  Research into 
the breadth of such effects, as well as the degree to which framing effects 
in fact may sway public opinion, would be worthwhile.
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